LATEST INTEL ON NORTH KOREA - Musudan missile!

North Korea has just released an image of Kim Jong Un posing in front of a Musudan missile (Hwasong-10) with the reentry vehicle removed. In addition to showing the grid fins in their stowed configuration, this view shows us the missile’s guidance package. The resolution is not high enough to positively identify specific components or assemblies, but it clearly isn’t the guidance system from a 1960s-vintage Russian R-27 missile. In the original Russian design, the rather bulkier guidance system was fit into a depressed cavity at the top of the propellant tank; the North Koreans have instead fit the electronics into the narrow space atop a normal tank dome. This means they have rebuilt the tank dome as well as the guidance system, though this comes as no surprise given that the missile’s propellant tanks have been stretched by almost 2.5 meters to increase its range.

(Photo: KCTV/Yonhap)

Even if North Korea obtained complete R-27 missiles from Russia in the 1990s, it is unlikely they would trust 40-year-old electronics to control it. And we know that North Korea has the ability to build their own guidance systems, whether for shorter-ranged Nodong missiles or for Unha satellite launch vehicles. We know from recovered Unha wreckage that they are willing to use modern imported commercial-grade electronics in their missiles, which would explain why their guidance system is smaller than the Russian original.

What we don’t know is how well it performs. Precision components like missile-grade mechanical or laser gyroscopes are difficult to build and difficult to import without it being obvious that one is importing missile parts. Possibly the North Koreans have found a supplier that doesn’t care, or possibly their own technicians have mastered the art of building these systems. At a minimum, the Musudan is capable of completing a flight without tumbling out of control, at least some of the time, and even if it is no more precise than North Korea’s other missiles, it is still almost certainly accurate enough to hit, for example, the island of Guam. Although, hitting specific targets on Guam, like the airbase or port facilities, will likely require additional testing for calibration even if the design is sound and accurate.

KMS-4 Nose Fairing Debris Found on Japanese Coast

KMS-4 Nose Fairing Debris Found on Japanese Coast

Summary

On June 17, more than four months after North Korea launched the Kwangmyongsong-4 (KMS-4) satellite, the Japanese Defense Ministry reported the discovery of the second half of the launch vehicle nose fairing on a beach in Yurihama, Tottori Prefecture, about 1000 km southeast of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station. The first nose fairing was recovered soon after the February 7 launch just off the coast of the South Korean Jeju Island (about 740 km south of Sohae). An assessment of photographs of the latest debris and the KMS launch vehicle used in the February 7 launch, suggests they match, although it is remarkable that the fairing material was buoyant enough to drift to Japan.

Analysis

Figure 1 shows the relationship of the two nose fairing pieces on the KMS-4 space launch vehicle (SLV). Faring A is the piece recently recovered in Japan, and Fairing B was the piece recovered near Jeju Island shortly after the February launch.

Figure 1. Kwangmyongsong (KMS)-4 SLV used in the February 7 satellite launch.

 

 

Figure 2 is the KMS-4 prelaunch image of the nose fairing released by KCNA. The attachment points match with those on the debris.

Figure 2. The KMS-4 nose fairing pre-launch.

 

 

Figure 3. Fairing A washed up on beach in Japan.

 

 

Figure 4 shows the nose fairing recovery locations relative to North Korea’s Sohae Satellite Launching Station and the ground track of the KMS-4 launch. Fairing A apparently drifted a considerable distance from where Fairing B was recovered. This brings to question the buoyancy of the fairing. The material used has not yet been reported, but if it is predominantly metal, it should have sunk instead of being carried by the currents. It is worth noting that while the fairing appears to be metallic, it is common for payload fairings to incorporate thermal or acoustic insulation on the interior. If insulation blankets or coatings were used, they might have been sufficiently buoyant to keep the entire fairing afloat.

Figure 4. Trajectory of the KMS-4.

 

Evidence of Probable Plutonium Production at the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility

New Evidence of Probable Plutonium Production at the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility

Summary

Recent commercial satellite imagery shows new evidence that North Korea is preparing to commence or has already begun conducting a reprocessing campaign to separate more plutonium for nuclear weapons at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center. This activity consists of the presence of two loaded railroad flatcars at the Radiochemical Laboratory loaded with casks or tanks that may be associated with chemicals used in a preprocessing campaign, a small exhaust plume at the facility’s thermal plant, the replenishing of the coal stockpile for that plant and the likelihood that the 5 MWe reactor is operating at a low level of power or not at all. Also, the North appears to have halted work at Building 500, a facility used to store liquid and solid waste in the past from reprocessing campaigns.

Exactly how much new plutonium Pyongyang can produce if such a campaign is underway remains unclear given uncertainties about the level of operations at the 5 MWe reactor which restarted in 2013. At maximum capacity, the reactor could produce approximately 6 kilograms of plutonium per year, probably enough for two nuclear weapons.

New Activity at Radiochemical Laboratory

Recent commercial satellite imagery shows exhaust plumes present at the Radiochemical Laboratory’s Thermal Plant on May 12 and 22 in addition to plumes observed during February and March of this year. Moreover, coal piles at the thermal plant began to be slowly replenished during February and as of May 22, appear to be at capacity.

 

Figure 1. Exhaust plumes seen at Yongbyon’s Radiochemical Laboratory’s Thermal Plant.

 

Imagery also shows two railroad flatcars present at the facility’s receiving building from May 13 to May 22. Similar flatcars have previously been associated with reprocessing campaigns in the early 2000s, and seen periodically at the facility since earlier this year, are loaded with what appears to be rectangular tanks or casks that could be used to supply chemicals for a reprocessing campaign, haul out waste products or a number of other related activities.

Figure 2. Railroad flatcars seen at the Radiochemical Laboratory’s receiving building.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Operations at the 5 MWe Reactor

Recent imagery shows two large trucks present on the east side of the 5 Mwe reactor, the exact purpose of which remains unclear. Moreover, there are no indications of steam generation or cooling water exhaust. This activity is similar to that noted in most previous 2015 imagery and, when taken in concert with the activity at the Radiochemical Laboratory, suggests that the reactor is not operating or is doing so at an extremely low level.

Figure 3. Two large trucks seen at the 5 MWe reactor.

 

Previous Activity at Building 500

As noted in previous analysis, the North built a new dirt access road and excavated a trench on the east side of Building 500 (located approximately 180 meters east of the Radiochemical Laboratory) earlier this year. Historically, Building 500 was used to hold liquid waste from reprocessing in large tanks in its lower level and solid waste on its main level but does not appear to have been used since the early 1990s. This trench measures approximately 7.5 meters by 48 meters (whereas the building itself measures approximately 25 meters by 75 meters). Imagery from May 22 indicates that the trench has not significantly changed since mid-April.

Figure 4. No significant change to recently excavated trench at the Building 500.

Progress at the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR)

Imagery from May indicates that the North has completed work at the ELWR’s transformer yard. The arrangement of power lines suggests that power could be fed both to the east and west. Grading or excavation operations continue around one of the ELWR’s cooling cisterns located approximately 150 meters southwest of the reactor. It is unclear whether this activity is related to the cooling water systems, the extraction of river sand and gravel, or a combination of both. Regardless, this activity strongly suggests that the ELWR is not yet operational.

Figure 5. Work on the ELWR transformer yard seems complete.

Figure 6. Grading or excavation continues around ELWR cooling cisterns.

Continued Activity at the Uranium Enrichment Complex

Imagery from May 22 shows only minor activity at a new facility whose purpose remains unclear in the southeastern corner of the uranium enrichment complex. While the building itself appears externally complete (with the exception of some surrounding roadwork) some foundation-type work has taken place adjacent to the chimney on the east side of the building. Additionally, the heavy construction crane observed in this area in May 11 and May 13 imagery is no longer present. This crane may have been moved to the area immediately south of the Centrifuge Building as a crane of similar size and configuration is present the May 22 image. No clear explanation for the crane’s presence here is apparent, however, it suggests that construction or maintenance work may soon start at the building south of the Centrifuge Building.

The rail yard that serves the Uranium Enrichment Complex remains active with the presence of several rail cars and material on the ground. Significantly, as noted above, is the presence of a flatcar loaded with four rectangular tanks or casks that is identical to one at the Radiochemical Laboratory.

Figure 7. Heavy construction crane seen next to Centrifuge Building, may indicate construction or maintenance work starting soon.

KIM's Partial Success for the Musudan

 

Summary

North Korea’s latest Musudan (Hwasong-10) missile test finally demonstrated the full performance of the missile’s propulsion system, and at least a minimally functional guidance system. The trajectory was not representative of an operational launch, and so leaves open questions about the performance of the reentry vehicle. Perhaps more importantly, two launches only a few hours apart and with one missile breaking up in flight, gives the North Koreans little chance of understanding what went wrong. The Musudan is not a reliable weapon, and Pyongyang does not seem to be trying to make it a reliable weapon. But even if this is just a propaganda stunt and the Musudan is to be quietly abandoned, this partial success increases the likelihood that North Korea’s KN-08 and KN-14 road-mobile inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) will reach operational status early in the next decade.

 

The Persistent Pursuit of the Musudan

After four consecutive failures in rapid succession, we figured we might have seen the last of North Korea’s Musudan missile. Given the pace of testing earlier this year, faster than any technical results could be interpreted and incorporated into a revised design, there was little chance of North Korea obtaining a useful weapon. At best, and only by luck, it might have scored a propaganda victory with a marginally successful flight. And with every failure, the odds of that seemed increasingly remote.

But if the North Koreans are in too much of a hurry to do the job right, they are at least persistent in doing something. And now it appears that they have at least a partial success to show for it. We have confirmed reports that two missiles were fired from mobile launchers near Wonsan on June 21, with one missile disintegrating in flight perhaps 150 km downrange and the second impacting at a range of 400 km. That is little more than a tenth of the Musudan’s expected range of roughly 3,500 km, but it is more than we had ever seen before.

This may be due to a modification in the missile’s aerodynamics. North Korea has released pictures of what appears to be a Musudan in flight with a set of eight grid fins around the base, which weren’t present in previous satellite or parade photos or in the old Soviet R-27 missile on which the Musudan is based. Presumably the North Korean engineers guessed that their modifications to the Musudan had compromised its stability in early flight, and that some extra aerodynamic controls would fix that problem. With no more than two months to work, this cannot have been much more than a jury-rigged fix based on an educated guess, but it was apparently a good one. Now they have to guess what went wrong to cause a missile to break up at 150 km, which will be rather more difficult.

Reports from Japan indicate that the second missile had reached an altitude of over 1,000 km, with North Korea claiming a very precise 1,413.6 km. This is far higher than would be normal for a missile of that size. A bit of analysis indicates that achieving this altitude would require roughly the full performance of the Musudan missile’s propulsion system, devoted to an almost perfectly vertical ascent. That’s not very useful from a military perspective, but it is still an impressive feat for a missile that last month was blowing up on the launch pad.

As a test, this isn’t as useful as launching the missile on its more usual ballistic arc. It gives the engines a full workout, but makes it harder to verify the performance of the guidance system. It also provides a different reentry environment, and testing the reentry vehicle is going to be critical to North Korea. Their older missiles entered the atmosphere at no more than half the Musudan’s speed. The North Koreans probably now know, for the first time, what happens when one of their warheads enters the atmosphere at roughly 10,000 miles per hour, but at an abnormally steep angle which will give a shorter but more intense heating load and do most of its deceleration lower in the atmosphere than it would in an operational launch. They might still not know whether the warhead would survive in an operational flight.

Why would they have tested a missile in such a manner? Examining a map of the region shows that there is really no way to launch a missile from Wonsan to a range of more than 1,000 km without overflying some foreign country, most likely Japan. The Japanese take a dim view of North Korean missiles flying over their country, and they have Aegis-equipped warships capable of shooting down missiles. Pyongyang apparently didn’t want to take that provocative risk.

They could have launched the missile from their Sohae Satellite Launching Station, which has clear range to the south as far as the Philippines. North Korea’s orbital launches have used this site and this trajectory, and it would have made for a more realistic test of the Musudan. Given that the Musudan is a mobile missile, they could have launched from any paved road along the southeast coast for the same effect. But North Korea’s engineers almost certainly would have wanted the support of powerful tracking radars and other infrastructure associated with a permanent launch site, and the Sohae site has only been used for North Korea’s nominally civilian satellite launches. There may have been some internal politics involved in the decision to loft the missile high over the East Sea and bring it down at such a short range.

The bigger limitation of this test is the decision to launch two missiles only a few hours apart. That decision greatly limits what can actually be learned from the test. There is no possibility, in that timeframe, of figuring out what went wrong with the first missile and fixing it. As with the earlier Musudan tests, this isn’t so much an engineering program so much as an exercise in tossing a coin or rolling a die until it comes up with the result they like. If North Korea’s sixth and latest Musudan launch counts as a success in their minds—and it well might—the one before it was still clearly a failure. Do they now have a reliable missile that had a spot of bad luck, or a dud that got lucky and worked once? We don’t know. Neither do they. And they knew from the start that they wouldn’t know if they had a reliable missile in the end.

So we should probably assume they don’t really care, that this was about propaganda and image rather than engineering and weapons development. They have achieved something that is as close to a win as possible without overflying Japan, and if they try again there’s a good chance that Musudan #7 will be an embarrassing failure just like Musudan #5.

Best case, they declare victory and go home, and make a quiet note to never actually trust the Musudan in wartime. Worst case, they tell their engineers to go back to their ground test facilities and turn this one-shot stunt into a useful weapon. The engineers in question would probably be quite happy to know they still have jobs, and turning the results from this spurt of unreasonably fast testing into a reliable weapon, would occupy them for a year or two at least. If they come back a year from now, testing Musudan missiles one at a time and with three to six months between tests, then we can start worrying about an operational Musudan.

But we should also consider worrying about an operational KN-08 or KN-14. These missiles use the same ex-Soviet engine as the Musudan, but in a clustered and multi-stage configuration capable of reaching much of the US mainland. We have seen them test this engine on the ground, but until now they had never successfully flown one. Even if North Korea retires the Musudan as too unreliable for anything but propaganda stunts, they will presumably ship any test data to the engineers building the ICBMs. And those engineers don’t seem to be under any pressure to rush into premature flight testing.

Regardless of the ultimate fate of the Musudan, the credibility of the KN-08 and KN-14 road-mobile ICBMs has increased a few notches. The North Koreans have the engines they need, and they can at least sometimes make them work in flight. There is still a great deal of work for them to do. The clustered twin-engine installation in particular will likely give them a few surprises on its first flight, and it will likely take them several tries to get the complete system right. We still don’t expect them to have those missiles operational before 2020, but early flight testing by that date is increasingly likely.

 

New North Korean Helicopter Frigates Spotted via RECON SATELLITE

Summary
Recently, commercial satellite imagery has identified two new North Korean helicopter carrying frigates. These are the largest surface combatants constructed by the DPRK’s Korean People’s Navy (KPN) in 25 years and appear to be primarily designed to counter what Pyongyang sees as a growing threat from South Korea’s acquisition of submarines that began in the early 1990s. Moreover, these vessels may have an important secondary role: the protection of fisheries in the West and East Seas, which has obvious important security implications for the Republic of Korea, Japan and China. Their introduction into the North Korean fleet may also represent an evolutionary step in the development of naval strategy to include helicopter anti-submarine operations.
Construction began in 2006-07 and both ships were launched during 2011-12. However, it is unclear whether they have been commissioned and are ready for service. Nevertheless, should the KPN push aggressively to commission and operate these new vessels, it will still likely take several years to fully integrate their new capabilities into fleet operations.
The construction of these vessels and other new classes of naval combatants over the past decade has been achieved during a period of prolonged and expanding international economic sanctions against North Korea as well as almost weekly media reports of its military decline, and national economic and industrial stagnation. North Korea’s deployment of new helicopter frigates may be an important wakeup call not only about the overall effectiveness of sanctions in constraining Pyongyang’s conventional military programs, but also the need to carefully and realistically reevaluate reports of its conventional military decline.
North Korea’s Naval Expansion Program: A New ASW Helicopter Frigate
During the late 1990s, as North Korea was emerging from a prolonged period of famine, floods and economic collapse, the Korean People’s Navy initiated a modest but wide-ranging modernization and shipbuilding program. That program included:

• Introduction of 14.5 mm and 30 mm Gatling-gun close-in-weapon-systems (CIWS) to replace old single- and twin-mount systems on existing patrol vessels
• Construction of a class of small catamaran-hulled fast patrol craft with at least two subclasses (PCF and PCFG)
• Construction of a class of very slender vessels (VSV) with at least three subclasses including patrol (PCF) and high-speed infiltration landing craft (HILC)
• Construction of a anti-submarine warfare helicopter frigate (FFH)

Of particular note, the KPN attempted for the first time to incorporate a degree of stealth technology in the design and construction of the catamaran-hulled fast patrol craft and very slender vessels.

Figure 1. Location Map

A key component of this program was a new ASW helicopter frigate. The KPN’s interest in such vessels dates back to the late-1970s when it began design of the helicopter carrying Soho-class guided missile frigate (FFGH). The design of this vessel was unusual and may have reflected indecision on the part of the KPN as to the vessel’s mission. The frigate had a catamaran-type hull, a flight deck that could accommodate one Mi-4PL ASW helicopter, four RBU-1200 anti-submarine warfare rocket launchers, depth charges, four SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship cruise missiles, a 100 mm gun for surface warfare and various air-defense weapons. The hull was laid down in June 1980 at the No. 28 Shipyard in Najin (Rajin), launched in November 1981 and commissioned in May 1982.
The vessel design was not successful, reportedly having problems with seaworthiness. As a result, only one was constructed and it passed the majority of its career in port, only occasionally venturing out to sea and never far out into the East Sea. Despite reports during the late 1980s that the North acquired new Soviet ASW helicopters, there is no evidence they were used on this vessel. During the 1990s, the vessel was moved to the Singyo-ri Patrol Base on the east coast and in the mid-2000s underwent refitting and its landing deck was refurbished. The vessel spent most of its remaining career at Singyo-ri until June-July 2007 when it was moved back to the No. 28 Shipyard in Najin and finally scrapped in mid-2009.

Figure 2. Soho-class FFGH, No. 823, seen at its Singyo-ri Patrol Base on North Korea’s east coast on November 5, 2006.

Note: image rotated. For all images, click to enlarge. Image © 2006 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing option, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Figure 3. A Mi-4PL ASW helicopter seen on the deck of Soho-class FFGH No. 823 sometime during 2004-2007.

Photo: KCTV screengrab.

New Helicopter Frigates
The failure of the Soho-class FFGH combined with the South Korean Navy’s aggressive long-term expansion of its submarine forces begun in the early 1990s, presented the KPN with a serious challenge given its declining antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Pyongyang was unable to address that challenge immediately because of economic hardship, but in the late 1990s, the KPN initiated a modest but wide-ranging modernization and shipbuilding program upgrading existing patrol craft as well as constructing a small catamaran-hulled fast patrol craft. That program eventually included a new class of small ASW helicopter carrying frigate (FFH) which is believed to have begun during 2006-07 with the decision to scrap the Soho FFGH. Design of the vessel was likely the responsibility of the Academy of National Defense Science’s Namp’o Ship Design Institute in cooperation with the Maritime Research Institute (a.k.a., Ship Research Institute), while the Second Economic Committee’s 6^th Machine Industry Bureau oversaw construction.

Figure 4. The Namp’o FFH seen berthed at the Namp’o Shipyard on December 27, 2013.

Visible in this image are the flight deck with circular “H” helicopter landing zone and four probable RBU-1200 rocket launchers on the bow. Adjacent to it is one of the KPN’s new 30 m-class VSV stealth patrol craft. Note: image rotated. Image © 2013 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing option, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

 Figure 5. Another Namp’o FFH seen berthed at the No. 28 Shipyard in Najin on January 17, 2014.

As with the Namp’o vessel, visible are the flight deck with circular “H” helicopter landing zone and four probable RBU-1200 rocket launchers on the bow. Note: image rotated. Image © 2014 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing option, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Recent commercial satellite imagery spotted the two new FFHs, believed to have been built at the Namp’o Shipyard and the No. 28 Shipyard in Najin. The vessel located at Namp’o was laid down in early 2010 and launched in about October 2011. The vessel located at Najin was laid down in early 2011 and launched by June 2012. It is unknown if either vessel has been commissioned.
Imagery indicates the two vessels are identical, measuring approximately 76 m x 11 m with an approximately 29 m x 11 m flight deck and armed with a suite of ASW weapons including rocket launchers and a helicopter as well as what may be a close-in weapons systems to defend against anti-ship missiles and small anti-aircraft missile mounts. Given the KPN’s tendency to mount anti-ship missiles on its larger combatants, these vessels could be armed with a variant of the Chinese C-802 (e.g., Iranian Ghader) in the future. The configuration of the superstructure forward of the flight deck is suggestive of a small helicopter hanger but this remains to be confirmed.

Table 1. Estimated Characteristics, new North Korean FFH

Length	76 m
Beam	11 m
Displacement	1,300 tonnes
Draught	3.4 m
Armament	4 x RBU 1200 ASW rocket launchers 1(?) x 30mm CIWS
Helicopter	1 x Mi-4PL or Mi-14PL

While these vessels appear to have been designed for anti-submarine warfare and general patrol missions, they may also be used to protect fisheries in view of increasing pressure from South Korean, Chinese, Japanese and Russian fishing fleets.
Assessment
While it is too soon to reach an assessment of the capabilities of these two vessels, it is likely that their greatest potential weaknesses are in radar, sonar and electronic warfare capabilities and antiaircraft/antimissile defense since the North’s defense industry is known to have serious shortcomings in both areas. This suggests that Pyongyang may reach out to external partners such as China and Iran for technology or equipment to address these shortcomings. Regardless, should the KPN push aggressively to commission and operate these new vessels it will still likely take several years to fully integrate their new capabilities into fleet operations.
These two new vessels are the largest surface combatants constructed by North Korea in 25 years and represent a new capability for KPN. Their introduction suggests that Pyongyang sees the growing South Korean submarine fleet as a credible threat and may represent an evolutionary step in the development of naval strategy to include helicopter anti-submarine operations.
Additionally, the construction of these and other new classes of naval combatants during the past 15 years has been achieved during a period of prolonged and expanding international economic sanctions against North Korea as well as almost weekly media reports of its military decline, and national economic and industrial stagnation. North Korea’s deployment of new helicopter frigates may be an important wakeup call about the overall effectiveness of sanctions and the need to carefully and realistically reevaluate reports of its conventional military decline.

ALERT**** ALERT****New Developments at North Korea’s Sohae Complex

Summary

Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates that North Korea is conducting a number of significant activities at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station (“Tongchang-ri”) related to the development of larger space launch vehicles (SLVs) and long-range ballistic missiles. Specifically, these activities are:

• One and maybe more engine tests of what is probably the first stage of a KN-08 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) were conducted in late March/early April 2014. With this latest activity, three KN-08 rocket engine test series have been identified for the first and possibly second stages dating back to mid 2013. As this effort progresses, the next technically logical step in the missile’s development would be a flight test of the entire system.

• Continued modification of the gantry previously used to launch the Unha SLV intended to enable it to launch larger rockets of up to 50 meters in height. Construction may not be completed until early summer, effectively preventing a launch from the facility in the meantime.
• New construction of what appears to be a circular structure with a diameter of about 40 meters and multiple interior walls. The purpose of the project—which has progressed rapidly over the past month, indicating a high priority—remains unclear, although the possibility that it is a new launch pad cannot be ruled out.

Figure 1. Construction underway at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station.

For all images, click to enlarge. Image © 2014 Airbus Defense and Space. All rights reserved. This image is not licensed for media usage.

Probable KN-08 Rocket Engine Test
Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates that North Korea has conducted one or possibly more tests of what appears to be the first stage of the KN-08 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile during a two-week period from March 22 to April 3, 2014. This conclusion is based on the following observations.
Activity at Missile Assembly Building: Imagery from March 22 shows a probable KN-08 first stage and its prime mover, a second stage and its prime mover, two white vans and a crane parked inside the fenced enclosure of the assembly building.[1] These rocket stages had either been delivered to Sohae by train or have been in storage at the facility (figure2). When this area was seen again on April 3, the first stage had been moved to the test area and only its prime mover and an unidentified truck were present.

Figure 2. Probable KN-08 stages and vehicles prior to movement to the test stand.

Image © 2014 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Engine Test Stand: Imagery from April 3 shows the first stage has been moved to the test stand, the site of the last suspected KN-08 engine tests in late August and December 2013 (figure 3). The stages tested appear to have the same dimensions—about 10 meters in length and 2 meters in diameter. Those dimensions are also the same as the stage observed at the assembly building on March 22. (The light blue color is identical as well.)

Figure 3. Tests of probable KN-08 first stage engines in late August 2013 and late March/early April 2014.

Images © 2013, 2014 Airbus Defense and Space. All rights reserved. These images are not licensed for media usage.

Aside from the movement of the stage from the assembly building to the engine test stand, imagery has identified three other indicators that it has been tested:

• Fuel tanks appear in different locations indicating that the unloading of fuel and oxidizers that precedes a test has taken place. Before a test, fuel and oxidizers are delivered to the stand in tanks and then pumped into larger tanks that are enclosed by the buildings on each side of the pad. When that process is complete, the empty tanks are stored off the pad and picked up for shipment to a chemical plant to be refilled.
• Stepped up vehicle activity on the pad is likely the result of a test in progress. Not only are fuel and oxidizer tanks delivered by truck and then removed, but the personnel who conduct these tests are transported to the pad. Vehicles also bring in the optical instrumentation needed to document the test and security vehicles close off the pad beforehand.
• Differences inside the flame trench and on the ground just outside it are consistent with the conduct of an engine test. Inside the trench there appear to be differences in the texture of the material. Just outside the mouth, white paths or trenches to instrumentation positions have been partially covered by dirt, probably from the blast (figure 4).

Figure 4. Before and after photos of possible engine test.

Image left © DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com. Image right © 2014 Airbus Space and Defense. All rights reserved. This image is not licensed for media usage.

Launch Pad Gantry Modification Continues: No Launches Imminent
Construction of the upper platforms on the gantry used to launch the Unha SLV continues, as does work on the new bridge to the pad necessary to handle larger new launch vehicles. The swivel work platforms have not yet been put on the tower and as of April 3, are still being assembled on the launch pad. Since construction is still not complete, an SLV launch from this facility is unlikely, probably until early summer (figure 5).

Figure 5. Ongoing construction at the launch pad.

Image left © 2014 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com. Image right © 2014 Airbus Space and Defense. All rights reserved. This image is not licensed for media usage.

New Construction Underway
Imagery has identified new construction of an unusual structure on the top of a hill to the north of the assembly building and about 200 meters northeast of a ground clearing seen in earlier imagery. Activity began after March 6 and major excavation was observed two weeks later. By April 3, the foundations for a circular structure—about 40 meters in diameter with many interior walls—had been formed but not yet completed. Near the center is a twelve-meter walled circular opening that is not yet filled in. One possibility is that this area is a flame trench with an opening on the north side of the structure (figures 5 and 6).

Figure 6. New construction spotted in late March.

Image © 2014 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Figure 7. New unidentified structure being built.

Image © 2014 Airbus Defense and Space. All rights reserved. This image is not licensed for media usage.

The exact purpose of this project remains unclear since it is still in the very early stages of construction. The possibility that the facility is a new launch pad cannot be ruled out although the design would be highly unusual. For one thing, the number of symmetrical internal walls and trenches seem excessive for support of a level pad. However, they could provide support to a gantry and a secure anchor for the center section of the pad. Another factor to consider is that the roads and bridges leading to the construction area have either been rebuilt or strengthened to carry heavy vehicles that could be used for transporting rockets. (Such vehicles would be unnecessary for transport to other kinds of facilities such as an observation building or instrumentation site.)

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 Measurements of the lengths of first and second stages seen near the assembly building are about 10 meters and 4.5 meters respectively, and both are about 2 meters in diameter. These compare favorably with the measurements of the KN-08 missiles shown in the 2012 and 2013 parades in Pyongyang that were 9.2 meters and 4.5 meters with diameters of about 2 meters as well as stages previously spotted at the Sohae engine test stand. It is also possible that the observed rocket engine could be the second or third or stage of a new large SLV under development.

New Developments at North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site

Summary
Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates that Pyongyang has begun new operations at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site. In the six-week period from early March 2014 until April 19, imagery shows an increase in activities at the Main Support Area. This area was used to manage operations and handle personnel and equipment during preparations at the West Portal area for the February 2013 nuclear detonation as well as at the South Portal area, where there are two completed tunnels. In particular, there appears to be movement of crates, boxes and materials near the entrances, possibly into the tunnels.
Recent press speculation has focused on the possibility of a nuclear detonation during US President Barack Obama’s upcoming visit to Seoul on April 24-25. That may be possible but appears unlikely based on the limited commercial satellite imagery available and observations of past North Korean nuclear tests. Recent operations at Punggye-ri have not reached the high level of intensity—in terms of vehicle, personnel and equipment movement—that occurred in the weeks prior to past detonations. Moreover, other possible indicators present before the North Korean nuclear tests in 2009 and 2013, such as communications vans and a satellite dish intended to transmit pre-test data, have not been spotted.
New Low Levels of Activity at the Main Support Area
Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates an uptick in activities at the Main Support Area, which played an important role in managing operations as well as handling personnel and equipment necessary for conducting the February 2013 test in the West Portal area. The area would presumably play a similar role in case of a test at one of the completed tunnels in the South Portal area.
While the access road has been kept clear of snow, there are no discernible vehicle tracks in either parade area. (During the 2-3 months leading to the 2013 test, vehicles, their tracks and personnel movements were very apparent in imagery.) By April 16, in addition to snow clearing, boxes (for what purpose is unclear) are now visible in the parade areas. This activity falls short of what has been observed in the past before North Korea has conducted a nuclear test.

Figure 1. Increased Activity at the Main Support Area.

The South Portal Area
Commercial satellite imagery from March and April 2014 indicates that activity has increased at the entrances to the two completed test tunnels in the South Portal area, although it still remains at a low level compared to preparations before past detonations. Imagery beginning in early March and most recently from April 19 shows a cleared parking area as well as the movement of crates, boxes and what may be lumber near those entrances over the past six weeks. It is possible these materials are being moved inside those tunnels. Vehicles are likely coming and going as shown in an image from April 19 of a large trailer truck traveling down the road away from the test site.

Figure 2. Activity Seen at the South Portal Tunnel Entrances Started in March.

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Figure 3. Low Level Activity Continues at the South Portal Area.

Figure 4. Large Trailer Truck Seen Leaving the South Portal Area.

Conclusion
While predicting a DPRK nuclear test is a difficult proposition under the best of circumstances even for intelligence agencies, it is even more difficult using the limited information provided by commercial satellite imagery. Pyongyang has only conducted three tests, making it hard to discern a predictable timeline for preparations leading to a detonation. Commercial satellite imagery is available relatively infrequently, providing only snapshots of activities that may be occurring.
With these caveats in mind, and based on available information, activities at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site could represent an early stage of preparations for a test or may be intended for a less provocative purpose, such as conducting maintenance after a long winter.
It is worth noting that none of the test indicators seen prior the two most recent nuclear tests (February 2013 and May 2009) have been spotted in available commercial satellite imagery. In addition to a greater movement of vehicles, personnel and material than the level seen on the April 19 image, communications vans and a satellite dish intended to transmit data were present at the test site prior to past detonations. While it is possible these indicators have been present at Punggye-ri but not imaged by commercial satellites, there is little evidence to suggest that a North Korean nuclear test will take place during President Obama’s visit to South Korea.