A Brief History of the US-ROK Combined Military Exercises
The
militaries of every country conduct field and command post exercises to
test their ability to perform missions dictated by their national
leadership. Because three countries conduct such exercises regularly,
numbering nearly two million soldiers in close proximity, the Korean
peninsula experiences a heightened level of exercises—and tensions—that
few other regions or countries share. Since the end of the Korean War,
two antithetically opposed halves of one Korean nation have stood ready
to attack or defend over a limited, mountainous terrain with massive
armies with distinctly different capabilities and with the potential of
killing hundreds of thousands of civilians in the early stages of a
conflict.
For the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States,
conducting exercises has required overcoming political, cultural,
doctrinal and philosophical differences since the end of the Korean War
to meet the North Korean threat from a combined posture. The history of
US-ROK exercises is dominated by the evolution of the bilateral military
relationship and this enduring threat, inter-Korean relations, and
US-DPRK relations. The base justification for these combined exercises
are the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty and the fact that the Korean
peninsula remains in a state of war due to the signing of an Armistice
Agreement in 1953 and not a peace treaty.
Historical developments have dictated four distinct
phases of military exercises and their political-military context on the
Korean peninsula: the early phase lasting from the end of the Korean
War to 1965; the “Second Korean War” phase of 1966-75; the expanded
capabilities phase of 1976-91; and the asymmetric capabilities phase
from 1992 to the present. The one constant in all four is the continued
conduct by North Korea of annual winter training exercises, offensive in
nature, that culminate in the early spring and bring the North’s
military readiness to its maximum level for that year.
[1]
US-ROK exercises have both military and political
intent. They, of course, are intended to test their preparedness and the
ally’s ability to conduct specific missions—in this case, to counter
North Korean military adventurism. But there is also a political message
for Pyongyang, namely that the alliance is prepared to protect the
state, people and territory of the Republic of Korea and their combined
interests while employing all the elements of national power to do so.
The Early Phase
The alliance’s combined exercises are a direct result of
the “Pusan Letter” of July 7, 1950, presented by then South Korean
President Rhee Syngman to General Douglas MacArthur, that passed
operational control of ROK military forces for defense against North
Korea’s attack starting on June 25, 1950.
[2]
Then the Commander-in-Chief of US Far East Command, General MacArthur,
passed operational control to his other command position, head of the
newly established United Nations Command (UNC).
[3]
After the war ended with the armistice, the UNC Commander retained
operational control of South Korean forces, thus compelling alliance
exercises to be combined, though not precluding national exercises
designed to maintain unit readiness at lower levels. After the signing
of the Armistice, the US began a steady drawdown of forces and the South
Korean military began to rebuild and reconstitute under a moribund
economy that limited its capabilities.
The early development phase was characterized by the
ideological clash of communism vs. anti-communism, economic recovery
that was initially more successful in the North than in the South,
political instability in the South, and force-building on both sides.
The first ROK-US combined exercise took place 16 months after the end of
the Korean War in November 1955. The ROK Army 5th Corps and the US 5th
Air Force conducted Exercise “Chugi,” or “Autumn Season,” under the
supervision of the Tokyo-based US Far East Command, which supervised the
UNC until 1957. Another exercise followed, designated “Spring Shower”
and the two set the precedent for combined exercises that still exists
today. Subsequent joint exercises, “Counterblow” and “Strong Shield,”
[4]
focused on interoperability and command relations between the two
militaries, maintaining a basic readiness posture and conducting
counter-insurgency operations.
With the establishment of the US Unified Command Plan in
1957, the US Far East Command was replaced by the US Pacific Command
and UNC headquarters moved from Tokyo to Seoul. After 1957 and up to the
establishment of the Combined Forces Command in 1978, the UNC planned
and led all combined exercises within the Alliance.
The “Second Korean War” Phase
North Korean provocations reached such a crescendo
during the late 1960s that this period earned the reputation as a
“second Korean War.” From 1966 to 1975, Pyongyang launched a steady
series of provocations aimed at taking advantage of the US military
commitment in Vietnam and the deployment of a corps-size ROK unit there
to support that effort.
[5]
North Korea’s military technology was very limited during this period,
relying on whatever equipment and technology the former Soviet Union and
China were willing to provide and thus unable to develop distinct
military advantages difficult for the alliance to counter. However,
North Korea began to slowly relocate much of its active-duty military
forces forward toward the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), thus reducing
warning time and complicating battlefield defense strategies for the
alliance.
Casualties were heavy on both sides as a result of these
clashes. Over one thousand ROK soldiers and policemen and 171 civilians
died as a result of North Korea’s armed infiltration operations while
111 American soldiers were wounded and 75 killed in action. This
included 36 airmen who died as a result of the North Korean shoot-down
of a US Air Force EC-121M reconnaissance aircraft in 1969. Almost 300
North Korean infiltrators were killed in action inside South Korean
territory.
[6]
Other major provocations during this period included the 1968 North
Korean attempt to assassinate ROK President Park Chung-hee, known as the
Blue House raid; another assassination attempt in 1974 that resulted in
the death of the South Korean first lady; and the 1968 hijacking of the
US Navy intelligence ship, the
Pueblo.
Beginning in 1968, the UNC revised its exercise program,
replacing Counterblow and Strong Shield with “Focus Lens,” and also
took advantage of the development of new approaches to war game
simulations. One major response to lethal North Korean provocations took
place during the first Focus Lens exercise of 1968 (infrequently
referred to as Focus Retina). Three airborne infantry battalions from
the 82nd Airborne Division flew 31 hours non-stop from North Carolina to
drop south of the Han River in a show of how quickly the US could
respond to North Korean hostilities.
[7]
The Expanded Capabilities Phase
The period from 1976 to 1991 was characterized by an
increase in the size of combined ROK-US exercises; the November 1978
establishment of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC), which assumed
leadership and planning of all combined exercises (and continues to
this date); the modernization of the ROK economy; and the dramatic
expansion of the North Korean military to over one million men on active
duty, as well as its continued deployment of forces in a forward
posture.
In 1976, the South Korean readiness exercises,
designated Ulchi, and Focus Lens were integrated to create an expanded
exercise that combined South Korean government and combined command post
exercises for a broader approach to defense of the ROK. Held annually
in late summer, Ulchi Focus Lens, or UFL, ultimately became the largest
computer-assisted simulation exercise in the world.
[8]
Additionally, beginning in 1976, the alliance introduced
a new exercise, dubbed “Team Spirit,” that emphasized force flow and
force-on-force operations. The ability of the United States to flow
forces to the Korean peninsula in case of conflict was a critical
component of operational plans and also demonstrated a continued strong
commitment to the defense of South Korea. Those forces would then
exercise with major units opposing each other in simulated battle.
Conducted in the early spring, Team Spirit served to unite several
smaller exercises into one large one emphasizing field-maneuver. It grew
over the years from an initial participation of 107,000 US and South
Korean troops to over 200,000 in the late 1980s.
[9]
Because of its size, Team Spirit became a major concern
for the North Koreans. It became a key issue in Washington-Pyongyang
negotiations during the nuclear crisis of 1993-94. Visiting North Korean
leader Kim Il Sung in 1993, New York Congressman Gary Ackerman stated
that Kim’s voice “quivered and his hands shook with anger” at the
mention of Team Spirit.
[10]
The combination of Ulchi Focus Lens and Team Spirit
during this phase was a major step in the ROK-US alliance efforts to
improve South Korea’s defense posture. However, toward the end of this
phase, North Korean capabilities began to go “asymmetric,” namely by
fielding of non-conventional weapons systems that were extremely
difficult to counter with conventional forces. Most importantly,
Pyongyang began programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and the
systems to deliver them.
The Asymmetric Capabilities Phase
Beginning in 1992 and lasting until today, this phase is
characterized by North Korea’s development of nuclear and missile
programs; the deployment of long-range artillery north of the DMZ
capable of striking all of Seoul and most of its suburbs; the fielding
of 200,000 special operations troops; the high degree of nuclear
tensions; the advancement of the North’s cyber warfare capability; and
the transition of operational control of South Korean forces back to
Seoul’s wartime control.
Moreover, North Korea’s political stability during this
period was significantly challenged by a failing economy and the great
famine of the 1990s that took the lives of somewhere between 500,000 to
3,000,000 North Koreans, depending on which source is cited. This had a
distinct impact on the stability of the North Korean regime and
suggested scenarios in which the North Korean military could react in
unpredictable ways that directly threatened South Korea. Would economic
collapse cause the collapse of the North Korean regime? If so, could
this lead to civil war that might spill over into the South? Would a
failing regime order an attack on the South to avoid losing power?
These changing conditions required changed responses
intended to cope with important challenges such as dealing with a
dramatically evolving threat, who is in the lead—ROK or US—and at what
point in crisis, and how does interoperability change with different
leadership?
From 1991 to 1996, Team Spirit became both a carrot and a
stick during US negotiations with North Korea over its burgeoning
nuclear program. This exercise was cancelled in 1992, carried out again
in 1993, and planned but not executed from 1994 to 1996 as a result of
negotiations that led to the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework and efforts
to ensure the framework remained in effect. Team Spirit was then
replaced with a command post exercise known as “Reception, Staging,
Onward Movement, and Integration” (RSO&I)—which was conducted from
1994 until 2007 along with “Foal Eagle,” a series of tactical level
exercises taking place in the spring. These exercises were much smaller
than Team Spirit but maintained staff readiness in the conduct of
flowing US forces to the peninsula.
In 2007, RSO&I was replaced by “Key Resolve” (a
command post exercise that trains staff instead of field units). Key
Resolve and Foal Eagle (the exercise for field units) run near
simultaneously and continue to be carried out. Ulchi Focus Lens
continued until 2007 when it was succeeded by “Ulchi Freedom Guardian”
(both command post exercises) to reflect changes of leadership within
the alliance.
The Future
The legacy of the ROK-US combined exercises is not only
vastly improved readiness in the defense of South Korea and the
continued deterrence of large-scale conventional attacks by Pyongyang,
but also North Korea’s healthy respect for the combined force posture of
the alliance. For the future, there are a number of issues that may
change how the allies conduct combined exercises. For example, the
operational control of the South’s forces is scheduled to transition to
the ROK in 2015, putting South Korea in charge of decision-making, and
planning. Second, when and if North Korea is deemed capable of mounting
nuclear warheads on delivery systems able to reach the United States,
exercises will have to be adjusted to reflect the new requirements for
defending American allies as well as the United States. These challenges
to the alliance will require military and civilian dedication, supreme
effort, artful leadership and not just a few dollars to accomplish.
