Thursday, May 15, 2014

New North Korean Helicopter Frigates Spotted via RECON SATELLITE

Summary
Recently, commercial satellite imagery has identified two new North Korean helicopter carrying frigates. These are the largest surface combatants constructed by the DPRK’s Korean People’s Navy (KPN) in 25 years and appear to be primarily designed to counter what Pyongyang sees as a growing threat from South Korea’s acquisition of submarines that began in the early 1990s. Moreover, these vessels may have an important secondary role: the protection of fisheries in the West and East Seas, which has obvious important security implications for the Republic of Korea, Japan and China. Their introduction into the North Korean fleet may also represent an evolutionary step in the development of naval strategy to include helicopter anti-submarine operations.
Construction began in 2006-07 and both ships were launched during 2011-12. However, it is unclear whether they have been commissioned and are ready for service. Nevertheless, should the KPN push aggressively to commission and operate these new vessels, it will still likely take several years to fully integrate their new capabilities into fleet operations.
The construction of these vessels and other new classes of naval combatants over the past decade has been achieved during a period of prolonged and expanding international economic sanctions against North Korea as well as almost weekly media reports of its military decline, and national economic and industrial stagnation. North Korea’s deployment of new helicopter frigates may be an important wakeup call not only about the overall effectiveness of sanctions in constraining Pyongyang’s conventional military programs, but also the need to carefully and realistically reevaluate reports of its conventional military decline.
North Korea’s Naval Expansion Program: A New ASW Helicopter Frigate
During the late 1990s, as North Korea was emerging from a prolonged period of famine, floods and economic collapse, the Korean People’s Navy initiated a modest but wide-ranging modernization and shipbuilding program. That program included:
  • Introduction of 14.5 mm and 30 mm Gatling-gun close-in-weapon-systems (CIWS) to replace old single- and twin-mount systems on existing patrol vessels
  • Construction of a class of small catamaran-hulled fast patrol craft with at least two subclasses (PCF and PCFG)
  • Construction of a class of very slender vessels (VSV) with at least three subclasses including patrol (PCF) and high-speed infiltration landing craft (HILC)
  • Construction of a anti-submarine warfare helicopter frigate (FFH)
Of particular note, the KPN attempted for the first time to incorporate a degree of stealth technology in the design and construction of the catamaran-hulled fast patrol craft and very slender vessels.
Figure 1. Location Map
A key component of this program was a new ASW helicopter frigate. The KPN’s interest in such vessels dates back to the late-1970s when it began design of the helicopter carrying Soho-class guided missile frigate (FFGH). The design of this vessel was unusual and may have reflected indecision on the part of the KPN as to the vessel’s mission. The frigate had a catamaran-type hull, a flight deck that could accommodate one Mi-4PL ASW helicopter, four RBU-1200 anti-submarine warfare rocket launchers, depth charges, four SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship cruise missiles, a 100 mm gun for surface warfare and various air-defense weapons. The hull was laid down in June 1980 at the No. 28 Shipyard in Najin (Rajin), launched in November 1981 and commissioned in May 1982.
The vessel design was not successful, reportedly having problems with seaworthiness. As a result, only one was constructed and it passed the majority of its career in port, only occasionally venturing out to sea and never far out into the East Sea. Despite reports during the late 1980s that the North acquired new Soviet ASW helicopters, there is no evidence they were used on this vessel. During the 1990s, the vessel was moved to the Singyo-ri Patrol Base on the east coast and in the mid-2000s underwent refitting and its landing deck was refurbished. The vessel spent most of its remaining career at Singyo-ri until June-July 2007 when it was moved back to the No. 28 Shipyard in Najin and finally scrapped in mid-2009.
Figure 2. Soho-class FFGH, No. 823, seen at its Singyo-ri Patrol Base on North Korea’s east coast on November 5, 2006.
Note: image rotated. For all images, click to enlarge. Image © 2006 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing option, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 3. A Mi-4PL ASW helicopter seen on the deck of Soho-class FFGH No. 823 sometime during 2004-2007.
Photo: KCTV screengrab.
New Helicopter Frigates
The failure of the Soho-class FFGH combined with the South Korean Navy’s aggressive long-term expansion of its submarine forces begun in the early 1990s, presented the KPN with a serious challenge given its declining antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Pyongyang was unable to address that challenge immediately because of economic hardship, but in the late 1990s, the KPN initiated a modest but wide-ranging modernization and shipbuilding program upgrading existing patrol craft as well as constructing a small catamaran-hulled fast patrol craft. That program eventually included a new class of small ASW helicopter carrying frigate (FFH) which is believed to have begun during 2006-07 with the decision to scrap the Soho FFGH. Design of the vessel was likely the responsibility of the Academy of National Defense Science’s Namp’o Ship Design Institute in cooperation with the Maritime Research Institute (a.k.a., Ship Research Institute), while the Second Economic Committee’s 6th Machine Industry Bureau oversaw construction.
Figure 4. The Namp’o FFH seen berthed at the Namp’o Shipyard on December 27, 2013.
Visible in this image are the flight deck with circular “H” helicopter landing zone and four probable RBU-1200 rocket launchers on the bow. Adjacent to it is one of the KPN’s new 30 m-class VSV stealth patrol craft. Note: image rotated. Image © 2013 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing option, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
 Figure 5. Another Namp’o FFH seen berthed at the No. 28 Shipyard in Najin on January 17, 2014.
As with the Namp’o vessel, visible are the flight deck with circular “H” helicopter landing zone and four probable RBU-1200 rocket launchers on the bow. Note: image rotated. Image © 2014 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing option, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Recent commercial satellite imagery spotted the two new FFHs, believed to have been built at the Namp’o Shipyard and the No. 28 Shipyard in Najin. The vessel located at Namp’o was laid down in early 2010 and launched in about October 2011. The vessel located at Najin was laid down in early 2011 and launched by June 2012. It is unknown if either vessel has been commissioned.
Imagery indicates the two vessels are identical, measuring approximately 76 m x 11 m with an approximately 29 m x 11 m flight deck and armed with a suite of ASW weapons including rocket launchers and a helicopter as well as what may be a close-in weapons systems to defend against anti-ship missiles and small anti-aircraft missile mounts. Given the KPN’s tendency to mount anti-ship missiles on its larger combatants, these vessels could be armed with a variant of the Chinese C-802 (e.g., Iranian Ghader) in the future. The configuration of the superstructure forward of the flight deck is suggestive of a small helicopter hanger but this remains to be confirmed.
Table 1. Estimated Characteristics, new North Korean FFH
Length 76 m
Beam 11 m
Displacement 1,300 tonnes
Draught 3.4 m
Armament 4 x RBU 1200 ASW rocket launchers
1(?) x 30mm CIWS
Helicopter 1 x Mi-4PL or Mi-14PL
While these vessels appear to have been designed for anti-submarine warfare and general patrol missions, they may also be used to protect fisheries in view of increasing pressure from South Korean, Chinese, Japanese and Russian fishing fleets.
Assessment
While it is too soon to reach an assessment of the capabilities of these two vessels, it is likely that their greatest potential weaknesses are in radar, sonar and electronic warfare capabilities and antiaircraft/antimissile defense since the North’s defense industry is known to have serious shortcomings in both areas. This suggests that Pyongyang may reach out to external partners such as China and Iran for technology or equipment to address these shortcomings. Regardless, should the KPN push aggressively to commission and operate these new vessels it will still likely take several years to fully integrate their new capabilities into fleet operations.
These two new vessels are the largest surface combatants constructed by North Korea in 25 years and represent a new capability for KPN. Their introduction suggests that Pyongyang sees the growing South Korean submarine fleet as a credible threat and may represent an evolutionary step in the development of naval strategy to include helicopter anti-submarine operations.
Additionally, the construction of these and other new classes of naval combatants during the past 15 years has been achieved during a period of prolonged and expanding international economic sanctions against North Korea as well as almost weekly media reports of its military decline, and national economic and industrial stagnation. North Korea’s deployment of new helicopter frigates may be an important wakeup call about the overall effectiveness of sanctions and the need to carefully and realistically reevaluate reports of its conventional military decline.

Thursday, May 1, 2014

ALERT**** ALERT****New Developments at North Korea’s Sohae Complex

Summary
Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates that North Korea is conducting a number of significant activities at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station (“Tongchang-ri”) related to the development of larger space launch vehicles (SLVs) and long-range ballistic missiles. Specifically, these activities are:
  • One and maybe more engine tests of what is probably the first stage of a KN-08 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) were conducted in late March/early April 2014. With this latest activity, three KN-08 rocket engine test series have been identified for the first and possibly second stages dating back to mid 2013. As this effort progresses, the next technically logical step in the missile’s development would be a flight test of the entire system.
  • Continued modification of the gantry previously used to launch the Unha SLV intended to enable it to launch larger rockets of up to 50 meters in height. Construction may not be completed until early summer, effectively preventing a launch from the facility in the meantime.
  • New construction of what appears to be a circular structure with a diameter of about 40 meters and multiple interior walls. The purpose of the project—which has progressed rapidly over the past month, indicating a high priority—remains unclear, although the possibility that it is a new launch pad cannot be ruled out.
Figure 1. Construction underway at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station.
For all images, click to enlarge. Image © 2014 Airbus Defense and Space. All rights reserved. This image is not licensed for media usage.
Probable KN-08 Rocket Engine Test
Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates that North Korea has conducted one or possibly more tests of what appears to be the first stage of the KN-08 road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile during a two-week period from March 22 to April 3, 2014. This conclusion is based on the following observations.
Activity at Missile Assembly Building: Imagery from March 22 shows a probable KN-08 first stage and its prime mover, a second stage and its prime mover, two white vans and a crane parked inside the fenced enclosure of the assembly building.[1] These rocket stages had either been delivered to Sohae by train or have been in storage at the facility (figure2). When this area was seen again on April 3, the first stage had been moved to the test area and only its prime mover and an unidentified truck were present.
Figure 2. Probable KN-08 stages and vehicles prior to movement to the test stand.
Image © 2014 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Engine Test Stand: Imagery from April 3 shows the first stage has been moved to the test stand, the site of the last suspected KN-08 engine tests in late August and December 2013 (figure 3). The stages tested appear to have the same dimensions—about 10 meters in length and 2 meters in diameter. Those dimensions are also the same as the stage observed at the assembly building on March 22. (The light blue color is identical as well.)
Figure 3. Tests of probable KN-08 first stage engines in late August 2013 and late March/early April 2014.
Images © 2013, 2014 Airbus Defense and Space. All rights reserved. These images are not licensed for media usage.
Aside from the movement of the stage from the assembly building to the engine test stand, imagery has identified three other indicators that it has been tested:
  • Fuel tanks appear in different locations indicating that the unloading of fuel and oxidizers that precedes a test has taken place. Before a test, fuel and oxidizers are delivered to the stand in tanks and then pumped into larger tanks that are enclosed by the buildings on each side of the pad. When that process is complete, the empty tanks are stored off the pad and picked up for shipment to a chemical plant to be refilled.
  • Stepped up vehicle activity on the pad is likely the result of a test in progress. Not only are fuel and oxidizer tanks delivered by truck and then removed, but the personnel who conduct these tests are transported to the pad. Vehicles also bring in the optical instrumentation needed to document the test and security vehicles close off the pad beforehand.
  • Differences inside the flame trench and on the ground just outside it are consistent with the conduct of an engine test. Inside the trench there appear to be differences in the texture of the material. Just outside the mouth, white paths or trenches to instrumentation positions have been partially covered by dirt, probably from the blast (figure 4).
Figure 4. Before and after photos of possible engine test.
Image left © DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com. Image right © 2014 Airbus Space and Defense. All rights reserved. This image is not licensed for media usage.
Launch Pad Gantry Modification Continues: No Launches Imminent
Construction of the upper platforms on the gantry used to launch the Unha SLV continues, as does work on the new bridge to the pad necessary to handle larger new launch vehicles. The swivel work platforms have not yet been put on the tower and as of April 3, are still being assembled on the launch pad. Since construction is still not complete, an SLV launch from this facility is unlikely, probably until early summer (figure 5).
Figure 5. Ongoing construction at the launch pad.
Image left © 2014 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com. Image right © 2014 Airbus Space and Defense. All rights reserved. This image is not licensed for media usage.
New Construction Underway
Imagery has identified new construction of an unusual structure on the top of a hill to the north of the assembly building and about 200 meters northeast of a ground clearing seen in earlier imagery. Activity began after March 6 and major excavation was observed two weeks later. By April 3, the foundations for a circular structure—about 40 meters in diameter with many interior walls—had been formed but not yet completed. Near the center is a twelve-meter walled circular opening that is not yet filled in. One possibility is that this area is a flame trench with an opening on the north side of the structure (figures 5 and 6).
Figure 6. New construction spotted in late March.
Image © 2014 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Figure 7. New unidentified structure being built.
Image © 2014 Airbus Defense and Space. All rights reserved. This image is not licensed for media usage.
The exact purpose of this project remains unclear since it is still in the very early stages of construction. The possibility that the facility is a new launch pad cannot be ruled out although the design would be highly unusual. For one thing, the number of symmetrical internal walls and trenches seem excessive for support of a level pad. However, they could provide support to a gantry and a secure anchor for the center section of the pad. Another factor to consider is that the roads and bridges leading to the construction area have either been rebuilt or strengthened to carry heavy vehicles that could be used for transporting rockets. (Such vehicles would be unnecessary for transport to other kinds of facilities such as an observation building or instrumentation site.)


 Measurements of the lengths of first and second stages seen near the assembly building are about 10 meters and 4.5 meters respectively, and both are about 2 meters in diameter. These compare favorably with the measurements of the KN-08 missiles shown in the 2012 and 2013 parades in Pyongyang that were 9.2 meters and 4.5 meters with diameters of about 2 meters as well as stages previously spotted at the Sohae engine test stand. It is also possible that the observed rocket engine could be the second or third or stage of a new large SLV under development.

Wednesday, April 23, 2014

New Developments at North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site

Summary
Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates that Pyongyang has begun new operations at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site. In the six-week period from early March 2014 until April 19, imagery shows an increase in activities at the Main Support Area. This area was used to manage operations and handle personnel and equipment during preparations at the West Portal area for the February 2013 nuclear detonation as well as at the South Portal area, where there are two completed tunnels. In particular, there appears to be movement of crates, boxes and materials near the entrances, possibly into the tunnels.
Recent press speculation has focused on the possibility of a nuclear detonation during US President Barack Obama’s upcoming visit to Seoul on April 24-25. That may be possible but appears unlikely based on the limited commercial satellite imagery available and observations of past North Korean nuclear tests. Recent operations at Punggye-ri have not reached the high level of intensity—in terms of vehicle, personnel and equipment movement—that occurred in the weeks prior to past detonations. Moreover, other possible indicators present before the North Korean nuclear tests in 2009 and 2013, such as communications vans and a satellite dish intended to transmit pre-test data, have not been spotted.
New Low Levels of Activity at the Main Support Area
Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates an uptick in activities at the Main Support Area, which played an important role in managing operations as well as handling personnel and equipment necessary for conducting the February 2013 test in the West Portal area. The area would presumably play a similar role in case of a test at one of the completed tunnels in the South Portal area.
While the access road has been kept clear of snow, there are no discernible vehicle tracks in either parade area. (During the 2-3 months leading to the 2013 test, vehicles, their tracks and personnel movements were very apparent in imagery.) By April 16, in addition to snow clearing, boxes (for what purpose is unclear) are now visible in the parade areas. This activity falls short of what has been observed in the past before North Korea has conducted a nuclear test.
Figure 1. Increased Activity at the Main Support Area.

The South Portal Area
Commercial satellite imagery from March and April 2014 indicates that activity has increased at the entrances to the two completed test tunnels in the South Portal area, although it still remains at a low level compared to preparations before past detonations. Imagery beginning in early March and most recently from April 19 shows a cleared parking area as well as the movement of crates, boxes and what may be lumber near those entrances over the past six weeks. It is possible these materials are being moved inside those tunnels. Vehicles are likely coming and going as shown in an image from April 19 of a large trailer truck traveling down the road away from the test site.
Figure 2. Activity Seen at the South Portal Tunnel Entrances Started in March.
.
Figure 3. Low Level Activity Continues at the South Portal Area.

Figure 4. Large Trailer Truck Seen Leaving the South Portal Area.

Conclusion
While predicting a DPRK nuclear test is a difficult proposition under the best of circumstances even for intelligence agencies, it is even more difficult using the limited information provided by commercial satellite imagery. Pyongyang has only conducted three tests, making it hard to discern a predictable timeline for preparations leading to a detonation. Commercial satellite imagery is available relatively infrequently, providing only snapshots of activities that may be occurring.
With these caveats in mind, and based on available information, activities at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site could represent an early stage of preparations for a test or may be intended for a less provocative purpose, such as conducting maintenance after a long winter.
It is worth noting that none of the test indicators seen prior the two most recent nuclear tests (February 2013 and May 2009) have been spotted in available commercial satellite imagery. In addition to a greater movement of vehicles, personnel and material than the level seen on the April 19 image, communications vans and a satellite dish intended to transmit data were present at the test site prior to past detonations. While it is possible these indicators have been present at Punggye-ri but not imaged by commercial satellites, there is little evidence to suggest that a North Korean nuclear test will take place during President Obama’s visit to South Korea.

Monday, April 7, 2014

North Korean Drone incursions drive South Korean air surveillance revamp

In the past week South Korea recovered two unidentified unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) believed to be North Korean spy drones that were not detected by the South’s radar surveillance network. Following this incident Seoul is likely to probe its aerial surveillance capabilities, particularly with counter-UAV performance in mind.
The drone that landed in the island of Baeknyeong is 1.83 meter long, has a wingspan of 3.2 meter wing span. The drone has a V-shaped (swallow) tail and it is powered by a piston engine, providing engine.
The drone that landed in the island of Baeknyeong is 1.83 meter long, has a wingspan of 3.2 meter wing span. The drone has a V-shaped (swallow) tail and it is powered by a piston engine, providing engine.
Alarmed by the incursions, Seoul stressed the urgent need to prepare more efficient countermeasures. According to Korean defense officials, the drones were on intelligence gathering missions but could be used on terror attack if adapted for such missions.
The drones were likely on intelligence gathering missions, reflecting the intensive spying activities North Korea is directing at the South. In recent years the ‘Democratic’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) has invested significant efforts in the development of unmanned platforms, which include intelligence gathering and attack systems. Nevertheless, the level of sophistication demonstrated by the two captured drones is not as advanced as could be expected, as the two drones lack real-time communications or high resolution payloads expected from such platforms. The vulnerability of the South to North Korean drones was realized in 2010, during artillery barrages fired by the north, Back then, the North reconnoitered areas near Baeknyeong and Yeonpyeong Islands with a drone that flew undetected by radar and mostly invisible to the naked eye.
“The military is preparing measures to deal with unmanned aerial vehicles, including North Korea’s lightweight aircraft, to complement the air-defense operation system,” a source at the defense ministry in Seoul said. “The ministry will also consult with the related agencies to draw up measures to control civilian UAVs and the registration system,” he added.
The presidential national security adviser Kim Jang-soo presided over an emergency meeting of the National Security Council to discuss how to beef up the country’s air defenses against such unmanned aircraft, sources said. The plan will call up measures to defend against such drones and other small aircraft that are hard to detect by radar and strengthen regulations on civilian drones.
Following the North Korean drone incursions, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said it is pushing to resume a troubled blimp development project, which has been delayed over technical problems.
DAPA will hold a meeting later this week to approve a plan to restart the surveillance airship project,” a DAPA official said. “Although front-line troops have spotted unmanned aerial vehicles believed to be sent by North Korea several times recently, the low-altitude radar recognizes them as birds,” an Army official said, commenting on the performance of existing TPS-830K low-level surveillance radar in service with the South Korean military. The military is considering purchasing advanced low-altitude surveillance radar to better monitor moving targets.
The Demilitarized zone is located at a mountainous area north of the capital, which clutters the view of ground-based radars, particularly at low altitudes, where small drones are operating. The Air Force has placed Gap Filler radar systems with a range of about 100 km in the front, but even these are not fully covering the area.
Seoul had also pushed to build a surveillance airship to better monitor the North Korean military near the western maritime border, after North Korea shelled a border island in November 2010, killing four people.
The 24 billion won (US$21.9 million) project initially aimed at deployment from 2012, but has since been delayed as arms makers struggled to make an airship suitable for the rapidly changing weather conditions in the western sea.
Seoul is also seeking to deploy GPS jamming systems that are likely to disrupt the navigation systems guiding the North Korean drones’ mission control systems. However, these systems could also risk civil aviation traffic and friendly drones, as demonstrated during a drone accident that killed an Austrian UAV technician in South Korea 2012.
The mini-drone that landed near Paju has a wingspan of 1.92 meters (6 ft 3 in), and a length of the 1.43 meters (4 ft 8in).
The mini-drone that landed near Paju has a wingspan of 1.92 meters (6 ft 3 in), and a length of the 1.43 meters (4 ft 8in).
The drone found on March 24 was a small ‘mini UAV’ class vehicle, it flew in a southward direction toward the capital Seoul, navigating by pre-set GPS waypoints. After flying over the city and taking images of the presidential office, the drone turned back toward north but crashed near the town of Paju, close to the DMZ. Throughout its flight it was not detected by the low-altitude surveillance radar, South Korean official admitted. When investigators probed the drones’ camera they were amazed to find pictures of military installations the residential quarters of Seoul’s presidential compound.
The Defense Ministry said Sunday that a wild-ginseng digger first found the drone in October of last year on a mountain in Samcheok, Gangwon Province, and reported it to the military authorities last Friday. It was of the same model found in Paju last month. Preliminary analysis also shows the computer components inside the drone contain chips and microprocessors released back in the early 1990s, but have long been obsolete. There were almost certainly many more that made the flight but made it back to the North safely.
The true value of the intelligence is marginal. South Korean military personnel commented, given the poor imaging quality of the payload and lack of communications link, transferring images to the ground in real-time. However, the virtual blindness of South Korean surveillance against those drones render such systems a potential weapon application, if equipped for terror attacks.
While the drones are based on basic technology, both have demonstrated an alarming capability gap in detecting and engaging unmanned aerial systems, particularly small and miniature drones that often evade detection by radar or acoustic means. The drone found in Paju was not detected by radar despite the fact it loitered over Seoul’s presidential office and highway linking the capital and the Demilitarized zone. This drone contained long shots of Cheong Wa Dae, the presidential reception palace in Seoul, raising doubt about the safety and protection of the airspace of the South Korean capital.
The drone found a week later in the island of Baengnyeong was larger, capable of flying at an altitude of 3 km with a maximum speed of 162 km per hour, carrying a mission payload of 20-25 kg. This drone was likely on post-mission surveillance, assessing South Korean units deployment following the artillery exchange in that area, in which North Korea fired 100 artillery rounds into the sea on the South Korean side of the maritime border, prompting Seoul to fire its own rounds back into northern waters. No one was injured in the exchange. This drone was reportedly detected by radar but the air defense did not engage it despite the fact it loitered over five different islands, watching military installations, including the 6th Marine Brigade stationed at the island in the midst of an artillery fire exchange between the north and south Korean armies.
Pyongyang is not limiting the use of drones for reconnaissance and intelligence. The North Koreans reverse-engineered several models of the US made MQM-107D Streaker targeting drones they acquired form Syria, modified into an attack drone. The drones were displayed publicly for the first time in April 2012 on a military parade in Pyongyang. They were demonstrated in operation in 2013.
Although the drone retrieved in Baengnyeong resembles that drone, the two platforms are different in size, propulsion, payload configuration and capacity.
North Korea is also believed to have used other types of unmanned aerial vehicles, including drones whose design is based on China’s D-4 and R-3 Rey.
The North Koreans reverse-engineered several models of the US made MQM-107D Streaker targeting drones they acquired form Syria, modified into an attack drone. The drones were displayed publicly for the first time in April 2012 on a military parade in Pyongyang. They were demonstrated in operation in 2013.
The North Koreans reverse-engineered several models of the US made MQM-107D Streaker targeting drones they acquired form Syria, modified into an attack drone. The drones were displayed publicly for the first time in April 2012 on a military parade in Pyongyang. They were demonstrated in operation in 2013.

Wednesday, March 26, 2014

North Korea’s Nuclear and Rocket Test Sites: Activity Continues but No Sign of Test Preparations

North Korea’s Nuclear and Rocket Test Sites: Activity Continues but No Sign of Test Preparations.

 

Summary
Recent commercial satellite imagery of North Korea’s nuclear and rocket test sites indicates that while activities continue, there is no evidence to suggest preparations for impending nuclear or long-range rocket tests.
  • Excavation continues on a new tunnel in the West Portal area of the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site, but there is little or no activity at other key parts of the facility.
  • Construction continues at the gantry and launch pad at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station (Tongchang-ri) where two launches of the Unha rocket were conducted in 2012. Work will not likely be complete for several months.
  • There is no test-related activity at the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground (Musudan-ri), which was last used for testing in 2009. However, a large amount of building material has arrived indicating construction will soon resume on the new assembly building.
While there are no signs of impending tests, activities at the three facilities indicate that Pyongyang is increasing its ability to conduct future tests. In the case of Punggye-ri, the North is expanding the number of tunnels available for future nuclear tests. In the case of its rocket launch sites, construction at Sohae and Tonghae is intended to enable those facilities to handle larger rockets, and possibly mobile missiles, in the future.
Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site
Commercial satellite imagery from March 2, 2014 indicates that fresh spoil has been excavated from the new tunnel entrance that Pyongyang has been excavating since mid-2013. Since early February, the North Koreans have extended the mining cart track, and new spoil that appears grey has been deposited over the snow cover. Mining carts are visible on the tracks and probable vehicles are seen on the road in the vicinity of the new tunnel entrance. There is no apparent activity at the Central Support Area or the Southern Portal where two tunnels appear complete. In short, there are no indicators that a new test will be conducted in the next few months.
Figure 1. Excavation continues at the West Portal.

For all figures, click to enlarge. Image © 2014 Airbus. All rights reserved. This image is not licensed for media distribution and cannot be used in any form by any media outlet.
Sohae Satellite Launching Station (Tongchang-ri)
Imagery from March 6, 2014 indicates that modifications continue to the gantry tower and launch pad, which were used to launch the Unha rocket in 2012, to prepare them to handle larger space launch vehicles. The structures comprising the upper two work platforms that will be added to the gantry tower meant to increase its height are visible on the pad near the gantry. They have been laid out in 5 rows of 4 pieces each since January 2014. The crane on top of the gantry will be used to move these pieces into place. Construction is also progressing on a wider road leading to the modified pad along with what appears a widening of the pad. Work may continue for several months, ruling out the possibility that there will be a long-range rocket launch during that timeframe.
Figure 2. Construction continues on the Sohae Launch Pad.

Image © 2014 Airbus. All rights reserved. This image is not licensed for media distribution and cannot be used in any form by any media outlet.
In addition to construction at the existing pad, there is renewed activity at the site further north, which could be intended to launch mobile missiles. (Since construction is still in an early phase, it is not possible to make a final judgment on the purpose of this site.)
Figure 3. Resumption of construction at the possible mobile missile launch pad.

Images © 2103 DigitalGlobe, Inc. (left) and © 2014 Airbus (right). All rights reserved. This image is not licensed for media distribution and cannot be used in any form by any media outlet.
Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground (Musudan-ri)
Imagery from March8, 2014 indicates that there is no activity at the existing launch pad. At facilities that have been under construction, on and off for two years, the new launch control building is now externally complete. Moreover, there are nearly 20 stacks of supplies adjacent to the new assembly building where no work has occurred since October 2013, indicating that construction may soon start again soon at this site.
Figure 4. Renewed construction activities.
Image © 2014 Airbus. All rights reserved. This image is not licensed for media distribution and cannot be used in any form by any media outlet.

 

Tuesday, March 25, 2014

North Korea steps up missile launches in apparent protest over U.S.-South Korea military drills.

North Korea steps up missile launches in apparent protest over U.S.-South Korea military drills.

People watch a TV news program showing rockets launched by North Korea, at Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea, Sunday, March 23, 2014. North Korea launched short-range rockets into the sea off its east coast for a second straight day on Sunday — 16 this time, according to South Korean officials.
AP Photo/Ahn Young-joonPeople watch a TV news program showing rockets launched by North Korea, at Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea, Sunday, March 23, 2014. North Korea launched short-range rockets into the sea off its east coast for a second straight day on Sunday — 16 this time, according to South Korean officials.
    North Korea launched short-range rockets into the sea off its east coast for a second straight day on Sunday – 16 this time, according to South Korean officials, in what’s believed to be Pyongyang’s way of protesting U.S.-South Korean military drills.
    National Post Graphics
    National Post GraphicsA total (and extensive) accounting of all of North Korea's conventional arms. Click through to see the full list.
    The rockets flew about 60 kilometres early Sunday morning, said Col. Eom Hyo-sik, an official with South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff. That’s about the same range as the 30 rockets the North fired early Saturday. South Korea believes the North fired FROG rockets, which are unguided, old Soviet-developed missiles that Pyongyang has had since the 1960s.
    Pyongyang claims its rocket launches are part of routine drills and self-defensive in nature, but there have been an unusual number this year – March has seen five launches so far – coinciding with annual, routine war drills by Washington and Seoul that North Korea claims are invasion preparation. Analysts say the impoverished North chafes against the annual drills because it has to spend precious resources responding with its own exercises.
    A week ago, North Korea launched 25 rockets with a range of about 70 kilometres, South Korea said, and earlier this month a North Korean artillery launch happened minutes before a Chinese commercial plane reportedly carrying 202 people flew in the same area.
    The Korean Peninsula remains officially at war because the Korean War ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty.
    Meanwhile, the leaders of the U.S., South Korea and Japan are set to meet and discuss North Korea in the Netherlands next week while attending a nuclear security summit.

    Wednesday, March 12, 2014

    North Korea Ably Evades Its Sanctions

     Recent inspections and seizures of banned cargo have shown that North Korea is using increasingly deceptive techniques to circumvent international sanctions, a panel of experts said in a report to the United Nations Security Council published Tuesday.
    After a series of nuclear and long-range ballistic missile tests by North Korea over the past decade, the Security Council has adopted resolutions calling for increasingly vigorous sanctions aimed at crippling the North’s financial and technical capability to build weapons of mass destruction.
    In its latest annual report, posted Tuesday on the United Nations website, the panel of eight experts said that North Korea has persisted in defying those resolutions not only by continuing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs but also by engaging in illegal arms trade.
    “It is experienced in actions it takes to evade sanctions,” the panel said. “It makes increasing use of multiple and tiered circumvention techniques.”
    The panel said the case of the North Korean cargo ship Chong Chon Gang had provided unrivaled insight into some of those techniques. The vessel was stopped by the Panamanian authorities in July 2013 while carrying undeclared weapons that had been hidden under 10,000 tons of sugar from Cuba.
    An investigation showed that the North Korean crew had used secret codes in communications, falsified the ship’s logs and switched off an electronic system that would otherwise have provided real-time information on the ship’s location to the international maritime authorities, the panel said. It added that it suspected the North Korean embassies in Cuba and Singapore of helping to arrange the arms shipment.
    The hidden cargo amounted to six trailers associated with surface-to-air missile systems and 25 shipping containers loaded with two disassembled MIG-21 jet fighters, 15 MIG-21 engines, and missile and other arms components, the panel said. Cuba has acknowledged that it was sending Soviet-era weapons to be repaired in North Korea.
    The Chong Chon Gang case helped confirm that one of North Korea’s most profitable sources of revenue remains weapons exports, as well as technical support to manufacture and refurbish arms produced in the former Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s, the panel said.

    Thursday, February 27, 2014

    A Brief History of the US-ROK Combined Military Exercises (SOUTH KOREA)


    A Brief History of the US-ROK Combined Military Exercises



    The militaries of every country conduct field and command post exercises to test their ability to perform missions dictated by their national leadership. Because three countries conduct such exercises regularly, numbering nearly two million soldiers in close proximity, the Korean peninsula experiences a heightened level of exercises—and tensions—that few other regions or countries share. Since the end of the Korean War, two antithetically opposed halves of one Korean nation have stood ready to attack or defend over a limited, mountainous terrain with massive armies with distinctly different capabilities and with the potential of killing hundreds of thousands of civilians in the early stages of a conflict.
    For the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States, conducting exercises has required overcoming political, cultural, doctrinal and philosophical differences since the end of the Korean War to meet the North Korean threat from a combined posture. The history of US-ROK exercises is dominated by the evolution of the bilateral military relationship and this enduring threat, inter-Korean relations, and US-DPRK relations. The base justification for these combined exercises are the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty and the fact that the Korean peninsula remains in a state of war due to the signing of an Armistice Agreement in 1953 and not a peace treaty.
    Historical developments have dictated four distinct phases of military exercises and their political-military context on the Korean peninsula: the early phase lasting from the end of the Korean War to 1965; the “Second Korean War” phase of 1966-75; the expanded capabilities phase of 1976-91; and the asymmetric capabilities phase from 1992 to the present. The one constant in all four is the continued conduct by North Korea of annual winter training exercises, offensive in nature, that culminate in the early spring and bring the North’s military readiness to its maximum level for that year.[1]
    US-ROK exercises have both military and political intent. They, of course, are intended to test their preparedness and the ally’s ability to conduct specific missions—in this case, to counter North Korean military adventurism. But there is also a political message for Pyongyang, namely that the alliance is prepared to protect the state, people and territory of the Republic of Korea and their combined interests while employing all the elements of national power to do so.
    The Early Phase
    The alliance’s combined exercises are a direct result of the “Pusan Letter” of July 7, 1950, presented by then South Korean President Rhee Syngman to General Douglas MacArthur, that passed operational control of ROK military forces for defense against North Korea’s attack starting on June 25, 1950.[2] Then the Commander-in-Chief of US Far East Command, General MacArthur, passed operational control to his other command position, head of the newly established United Nations Command (UNC).[3] After the war ended with the armistice, the UNC Commander retained operational control of South Korean forces, thus compelling alliance exercises to be combined, though not precluding national exercises designed to maintain unit readiness at lower levels. After the signing of the Armistice, the US began a steady drawdown of forces and the South Korean military began to rebuild and reconstitute under a moribund economy that limited its capabilities.
    The early development phase was characterized by the ideological clash of communism vs. anti-communism, economic recovery that was initially more successful in the North than in the South, political instability in the South, and force-building on both sides. The first ROK-US combined exercise took place 16 months after the end of the Korean War in November 1955. The ROK Army 5th Corps and the US 5th Air Force conducted Exercise “Chugi,” or “Autumn Season,” under the supervision of the Tokyo-based US Far East Command, which supervised the UNC until 1957. Another exercise followed, designated “Spring Shower” and the two set the precedent for combined exercises that still exists today. Subsequent joint exercises, “Counterblow” and “Strong Shield,”[4] focused on interoperability and command relations between the two militaries, maintaining a basic readiness posture and conducting counter-insurgency operations.
    With the establishment of the US Unified Command Plan in 1957, the US Far East Command was replaced by the US Pacific Command and UNC headquarters moved from Tokyo to Seoul. After 1957 and up to the establishment of the Combined Forces Command in 1978, the UNC planned and led all combined exercises within the Alliance.
    The “Second Korean War” Phase
    North Korean provocations reached such a crescendo during the late 1960s that this period earned the reputation as a “second Korean War.” From 1966 to 1975, Pyongyang launched a steady series of provocations aimed at taking advantage of the US military commitment in Vietnam and the deployment of a corps-size ROK unit there to support that effort.[5] North Korea’s military technology was very limited during this period, relying on whatever equipment and technology the former Soviet Union and China were willing to provide and thus unable to develop distinct military advantages difficult for the alliance to counter. However, North Korea began to slowly relocate much of its active-duty military forces forward toward the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), thus reducing warning time and complicating battlefield defense strategies for the alliance.
    Casualties were heavy on both sides as a result of these clashes. Over one thousand ROK soldiers and policemen and 171 civilians died as a result of North Korea’s armed infiltration operations while 111 American soldiers were wounded and 75 killed in action. This included 36 airmen who died as a result of the North Korean shoot-down of a US Air Force EC-121M reconnaissance aircraft in 1969. Almost 300 North Korean infiltrators were killed in action inside South Korean territory.[6] Other major provocations during this period included the 1968 North Korean attempt to assassinate ROK President Park Chung-hee, known as the Blue House raid; another assassination attempt in 1974 that resulted in the death of the South Korean first lady; and the 1968 hijacking of the US Navy intelligence ship, the Pueblo.
    Beginning in 1968, the UNC revised its exercise program, replacing Counterblow and Strong Shield with “Focus Lens,” and also took advantage of the development of new approaches to war game simulations. One major response to lethal North Korean provocations took place during the first Focus Lens exercise of 1968 (infrequently referred to as Focus Retina). Three airborne infantry battalions from the 82nd Airborne Division flew 31 hours non-stop from North Carolina to drop south of the Han River in a show of how quickly the US could respond to North Korean hostilities.[7]
    The Expanded Capabilities Phase
    The period from 1976 to 1991 was characterized by an increase in the size of combined ROK-US exercises; the November 1978 establishment of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC), which assumed leadership and planning of all combined exercises (and continues to this date); the modernization of the ROK economy; and the dramatic expansion of the North Korean military to over one million men on active duty, as well as its continued deployment of forces in a forward posture.
    In 1976, the South Korean readiness exercises, designated Ulchi, and Focus Lens were integrated to create an expanded exercise that combined South Korean government and combined command post exercises for a broader approach to defense of the ROK. Held annually in late summer, Ulchi Focus Lens, or UFL, ultimately became the largest computer-assisted simulation exercise in the world.[8]
    Additionally, beginning in 1976, the alliance introduced a new exercise, dubbed “Team Spirit,” that emphasized force flow and force-on-force operations. The ability of the United States to flow forces to the Korean peninsula in case of conflict was a critical component of operational plans and also demonstrated a continued strong commitment to the defense of South Korea. Those forces would then exercise with major units opposing each other in simulated battle. Conducted in the early spring, Team Spirit served to unite several smaller exercises into one large one emphasizing field-maneuver. It grew over the years from an initial participation of 107,000 US and South Korean troops to over 200,000 in the late 1980s.[9]
    Because of its size, Team Spirit became a major concern for the North Koreans. It became a key issue in Washington-Pyongyang negotiations during the nuclear crisis of 1993-94. Visiting North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in 1993, New York Congressman Gary Ackerman stated that Kim’s voice “quivered and his hands shook with anger” at the mention of Team Spirit.[10]
    The combination of Ulchi Focus Lens and Team Spirit during this phase was a major step in the ROK-US alliance efforts to improve South Korea’s defense posture. However, toward the end of this phase, North Korean capabilities began to go “asymmetric,” namely by fielding of non-conventional weapons systems that were extremely difficult to counter with conventional forces. Most importantly, Pyongyang began programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and the systems to deliver them.
    The Asymmetric Capabilities Phase
    Beginning in 1992 and lasting until today, this phase is characterized by North Korea’s development of nuclear and missile programs; the deployment of long-range artillery north of the DMZ capable of striking all of Seoul and most of its suburbs; the fielding of 200,000 special operations troops; the high degree of nuclear tensions; the advancement of the North’s cyber warfare capability; and the transition of operational control of South Korean forces back to Seoul’s wartime control.
    Moreover, North Korea’s political stability during this period was significantly challenged by a failing economy and the great famine of the 1990s that took the lives of somewhere between 500,000 to 3,000,000 North Koreans, depending on which source is cited. This had a distinct impact on the stability of the North Korean regime and suggested scenarios in which the North Korean military could react in unpredictable ways that directly threatened South Korea. Would economic collapse cause the collapse of the North Korean regime? If so, could this lead to civil war that might spill over into the South? Would a failing regime order an attack on the South to avoid losing power?
    These changing conditions required changed responses intended to cope with important challenges such as dealing with a dramatically evolving threat, who is in the lead—ROK or US—and at what point in crisis, and how does interoperability change with different leadership?
    From 1991 to 1996, Team Spirit became both a carrot and a stick during US negotiations with North Korea over its burgeoning nuclear program. This exercise was cancelled in 1992, carried out again in 1993, and planned but not executed from 1994 to 1996 as a result of negotiations that led to the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework and efforts to ensure the framework remained in effect. Team Spirit was then replaced with a command post exercise known as “Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration” (RSO&I)—which was conducted from 1994 until 2007 along with “Foal Eagle,” a series of tactical level exercises taking place in the spring. These exercises were much smaller than Team Spirit but maintained staff readiness in the conduct of flowing US forces to the peninsula.
    In 2007, RSO&I was replaced by “Key Resolve” (a command post exercise that trains staff instead of field units). Key Resolve and Foal Eagle (the exercise for field units) run near simultaneously and continue to be carried out. Ulchi Focus Lens continued until 2007 when it was succeeded by “Ulchi Freedom Guardian” (both command post exercises) to reflect changes of leadership within the alliance.
    The Future
    The legacy of the ROK-US combined exercises is not only vastly improved readiness in the defense of South Korea and the continued deterrence of large-scale conventional attacks by Pyongyang, but also North Korea’s healthy respect for the combined force posture of the alliance. For the future, there are a number of issues that may change how the allies conduct combined exercises. For example, the operational control of the South’s forces is scheduled to transition to the ROK in 2015, putting South Korea in charge of decision-making, and planning. Second, when and if North Korea is deemed capable of mounting nuclear warheads on delivery systems able to reach the United States, exercises will have to be adjusted to reflect the new requirements for defending American allies as well as the United States. These challenges to the alliance will require military and civilian dedication, supreme effort, artful leadership and not just a few dollars to accomplish.

    Friday, February 14, 2014

    LATEST INTEL: North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site Excavation Activity!

    North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site Excavation Activity!

     Significant Acceleration in Excavation Activity

     No Test Indicators


    Summary
    Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates a significant acceleration in excavation activity at the West Portal area since last viewed in early December 2013. The size of the pile of spoil excavated from a new tunnel appears to have doubled in a period of a little over a month. Exactly what accounts for this acceleration remains unclear. However, it is unlikely Pyongyang intends to use this tunnel for its next nuclear test since two other tunnels in the Southern area of the site appear complete. Because the Southern area is often covered in shadows during the winter, coverage by commercial satellites can prove to be spotty. As a result, it was not possible to view the tunnel entrances in the most recent February imagery.
    Once a decision is made in Pyongyang, indicators visible in satellite imagery of an impending nuclear test can appear 4-6 weeks prior to the test, both near the tunnel entrance and in other areas of the site. In the past, they have included:
    • Camouflage netting deployed to conceal activities at the tunnel entrance itself during preparations for a blast;
    • A satellite communications dish for relaying data off-site in the vicinity of the test tunnel;
    • A special vehicle covered by an awning and surrounded by many personnel in the central support/staging area; and
    • A marked increase in overall activity at the central support area and roads leading to the test tunnel.
    Based on the most recent satellite imagery, there are no signs that a test is in preparation.
    Accelerated Tunnel Excavation at the West Portal Area
    Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates a significant increase in excavation activity at a new still incomplete tunnel to be used for a future nuclear test in the West Portal area. As previously discussed, excavation of this new tunnel was first detected in May 2013 and continued throughout the year. Imagery from February 3, 2014 shows that the spoil pile—consisting of debris from excavation—apparently doubled in size from what was done during all of 2013. (Mining carts can be seen on the tracks to the spoil pile.) In fact, spoil recently dumped onto the pile spilled on the access road to the portal requiring that it be cleared.

    Figure 1. Spoil pile growth in 2014.


    As of December 2013, the volume of spoil was estimated to be some 2000 cubic meters. Assuming a two meter wide by two meter tall tunnel that would allow sufficient access but still minimize the amount of digging required, that volume of spoil would have corresponded to 500 meters of tunnel. Since December 2013, and especially in January, digging was accelerated and the spoil pile area appears to have doubled again, implying yet another 500 meters of tunnel dug. It must be recognized, however, that satellite imagery estimates are often imprecise because the depth of the spoil pile can only be roughly estimated.
    If these estimates are correct, they represent a significant acceleration of North Korean efforts since the beginning of 2014 to complete excavation of this new tunnel. There may be a number of possible explanations including: 1) the tunnel may have become easier to excavate because the rock is softer or looser; 2) the North Koreans may be trying to make up lost time to meet the tunnel’s scheduled date for completion; or 3) Pyongyang has decided to accelerate work in order to complete the tunnel ahead of schedule.
    Is a Test in the Works?
    In addition to the tunnel under excavation at the West Portal area, North Korea appears to have two completed tunnels at the South Portal area that could be used for a nuclear test if Pyongyang decided to conduct one. When last viewed in early December 2013 there were no signs of test preparations, although it is likely a test could be prepared in 1-2 months once the order is given by Pyongyang.
    According to press reports, South Korean Minister of Defense Kim Kwan-jin recently stated that the North appears ready to conduct another test although there are no signs that a blast is imminent. That assessment appears correct, although in the most recent February image, the entrances to the two completed tunnels in the South Portal area are in a deep shadow, as they will be for much of the winter, making it difficult to determine if any activity is taking place there.
    Based on observation of the previous North Korean nuclear tests in 2009 and 2013, once a decision is made in Pyongyang, indicators visible in satellite imagery of an impending nuclear test can appear 4-6 weeks prior to a detonation. Possible indicators—some at the entrances and some away from them—observed in past tests have included:
    • The North Koreans appear to have deployed camouflage netting to conceal activities at the tunnel entrance itself during preparations for a blast.
    • A satellite communications dish for relaying data off-site was present in the weeks prior to the February 2013 detonation and then removed ten days before the blast. A similar dish was present before the 2009 test in the vicinity of the test tunnel.
    • A special vehicle covered by an awning and surrounded by many personnel whose purpose was unclear was present in the central support/staging area on February 9, 2013, just four days before the detonation.
    • There was a marked increase in overall activity at the central support area and roads leading to the test tunnel in the weeks before the February 2013 blast. Such activity would be expected if North Korea were preparing for a detonation.
    As of the most recent satellite imagery there are no signs that a test is in preparations.

    Wednesday, January 29, 2014

    North Korea warns of tensions over U.S.- South Korea war games

    A North Korean Embassy official gestures to allow questions at a press conference by North Korean Ambassador to China Ji Jae Ryong, seated center, at the North Korean Embassy in Beijing, China, Wednesday, Jan. 29, 2014. North Korea’s propaganda machine is churning out near-daily diatribes against the United States and South Korea for a series of soon-to-start military maneuvers, warning nuclear war could be imminent and saying it will take dramatic action of its own if further provoked. Ji offered a somewhat less caustic line at a rare news conference on Wednesday. Ji told international media the north wanted to reduce tensions to allow steps toward reconciliation and eventual unification between North and South. Also in the photo are two translators and a North Korean photographer. (AP Photo/Alexander F. Yuan)


    A North Korean Embassy official gestures to allow questions at a press conference by North Korean Ambassador to China Ji Jae Ryong, seated center, at the North Korean Embassy in Beijing, China, Wednesday. Ji told international media the north wanted to reduce tensions to allow steps toward reconciliation and eventual unification between North and South.

    SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea’s propaganda machine is churning out near-daily denunciations of the United States and South Korea for a series of soon-to-start military maneuvers, warning nuclear war could be imminent and saying it will take dramatic action of its own if further provoked.
    Sound familiar?
    North Korea’s increasingly shrill opposition to the annual joint drills named Foal Eagle looks very similar to the kind of vitriol that preceded the start of the same exercises last year and led to a steep rise in tensions on the Korean Peninsula. That round of escalation culminated in threats of a nuclear strike on Washington and the flattening of Seoul before the maneuvers ended and both sides went back to their corners.
    It appears the first stages of this year’s battle have already begun — though some experts say they don’t think it will be as high-pitched as last year’s.


    In the latest of North Korea’s increasingly frequent salvos against the exercises, it said through its state-run media that the United States is building up its military forces in Asia so it can invade the country — formally called the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK — and take control of the whole region.
    “It is the strategic goal of the U.S. to invade the DPRK, bring its neighboring countries under its control with it as a stepping-stone and, furthermore, dominate the whole Asia-Pacific region,” the ruling party’s Rodong Sinmun said in an analysis on Monday. “The U.S. is working hard to kick off large-scale joint military drills this year, too, for the purpose of mounting a pre-emptive nuclear attack upon the DPRK.”
    A North Korean man walks past propaganda posters in Pyongyang, North Korea last March. The posters threaten punishment to the "U.S. imperialists and their allies." North Korea’s propaganda machine is churning out near-daily diatribes against the United States and South Korea for a series of soon-to-start military maneuvers.

    A North Korean man walks past propaganda posters in Pyongyang, North Korea last March. The posters threaten punishment to the "U.S. imperialists and their allies." North Korea’s propaganda machine is churning out near-daily diatribes against the United States and South Korea for a series of soon-to-start military maneuvers.

    The invectives against the exercises began earlier this month, when North Korea’s powerful National Defense Commission proposed the rivals halt military actions and “mutual vilification” to build better relations. The North, however, strongly hinted it would maintain its nuclear weapons program while urging South Korea to cancel the drills with the United States, set to begin in late February.
    North Korea’s ambassador to key ally China offered a somewhat less caustic line at a rare news conference on Wednesday. Ji Jae Ryong told international media that North Korea wants to reduce tensions to allow steps toward reconciliation and eventual unification between North and South.


    “First, we propose taking preparatory measures in response to the warm call for creating an atmosphere for improving North-South ties. In this regard, we officially propose the South Korean authorities take critical measures of halting acts of provoking and slandering the other side from Jan. 30,” Ji said.
    But Ji reiterated that North Korea had no intention of abandoning its nuclear weapons program.
    Seoul-based analyst Daniel Pinkston, of the International Crisis Group, said that although some experts saw the proposal as an overture or part of a “charm offensive” by North Korea, it was intended more as a means of setting the stage for more heated actions ahead — since the North has no reason to expect that Washington and Seoul would seriously consider nixing Foal Eagle.
    “It feeds into the propaganda cycle again,” he said. “It’s a way of showing the domestic audience that, ‘we made a serious overture. We tried to bend over backwards. But they showed their true colors.’ I don’t see any cooperative measures or charm offensive at all.”
    U.S. Special Representative for North Korean Policy Glyn Davies, left, talks with South Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Kyou-hyun during their meeting at the Foreign Ministry in Seoul, South Korea, Wednesday.

    U.S. Special Representative for North Korean Policy Glyn Davies, left, talks with South Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Kyou-hyun during their meeting at the Foreign Ministry in Seoul, South Korea, Wednesday.


    Seoul and Washington have essentially ignored North Korea’s proposal.
    Seoul instead demanded that North Korea take “practical” action for nuclear disarmament if it truly wants peace on the peninsula. But Seoul has proposed working-level talks on Wednesday to discuss allowing Koreans separated by the 1950-53 Korean War to reunite. North Korea didn’t immediately respond to Seoul’s proposals.
    The fighting between North and South Korea ended six decades ago with an armistice, not a peace treaty, leaving the peninsula still technically in a state of war. North Korea remains highly sensitive to all military activity in the South, and sees Seoul as a puppet state because nearly 30,000 U.S. troops are based on its soil.
    This year’s drills, in which troops will train on land, sea and in the air, are expected to last until about April.
    Yoo Ho-yeol, a professor of North Korea studies at Korea University in South Korea, said he doesn’t expect as much tension as last year.
    “North Korea is maintaining its nuclear weapons program but hasn’t launched any fresh provocation, so this year’s drills would be more like the routine ones they conducted in previous years,” he said.