Thursday, February 27, 2014

A Brief History of the US-ROK Combined Military Exercises (SOUTH KOREA)

A Brief History of the US-ROK Combined Military Exercises

The militaries of every country conduct field and command post exercises to test their ability to perform missions dictated by their national leadership. Because three countries conduct such exercises regularly, numbering nearly two million soldiers in close proximity, the Korean peninsula experiences a heightened level of exercises—and tensions—that few other regions or countries share. Since the end of the Korean War, two antithetically opposed halves of one Korean nation have stood ready to attack or defend over a limited, mountainous terrain with massive armies with distinctly different capabilities and with the potential of killing hundreds of thousands of civilians in the early stages of a conflict.
For the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States, conducting exercises has required overcoming political, cultural, doctrinal and philosophical differences since the end of the Korean War to meet the North Korean threat from a combined posture. The history of US-ROK exercises is dominated by the evolution of the bilateral military relationship and this enduring threat, inter-Korean relations, and US-DPRK relations. The base justification for these combined exercises are the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty and the fact that the Korean peninsula remains in a state of war due to the signing of an Armistice Agreement in 1953 and not a peace treaty.
Historical developments have dictated four distinct phases of military exercises and their political-military context on the Korean peninsula: the early phase lasting from the end of the Korean War to 1965; the “Second Korean War” phase of 1966-75; the expanded capabilities phase of 1976-91; and the asymmetric capabilities phase from 1992 to the present. The one constant in all four is the continued conduct by North Korea of annual winter training exercises, offensive in nature, that culminate in the early spring and bring the North’s military readiness to its maximum level for that year.[1]
US-ROK exercises have both military and political intent. They, of course, are intended to test their preparedness and the ally’s ability to conduct specific missions—in this case, to counter North Korean military adventurism. But there is also a political message for Pyongyang, namely that the alliance is prepared to protect the state, people and territory of the Republic of Korea and their combined interests while employing all the elements of national power to do so.
The Early Phase
The alliance’s combined exercises are a direct result of the “Pusan Letter” of July 7, 1950, presented by then South Korean President Rhee Syngman to General Douglas MacArthur, that passed operational control of ROK military forces for defense against North Korea’s attack starting on June 25, 1950.[2] Then the Commander-in-Chief of US Far East Command, General MacArthur, passed operational control to his other command position, head of the newly established United Nations Command (UNC).[3] After the war ended with the armistice, the UNC Commander retained operational control of South Korean forces, thus compelling alliance exercises to be combined, though not precluding national exercises designed to maintain unit readiness at lower levels. After the signing of the Armistice, the US began a steady drawdown of forces and the South Korean military began to rebuild and reconstitute under a moribund economy that limited its capabilities.
The early development phase was characterized by the ideological clash of communism vs. anti-communism, economic recovery that was initially more successful in the North than in the South, political instability in the South, and force-building on both sides. The first ROK-US combined exercise took place 16 months after the end of the Korean War in November 1955. The ROK Army 5th Corps and the US 5th Air Force conducted Exercise “Chugi,” or “Autumn Season,” under the supervision of the Tokyo-based US Far East Command, which supervised the UNC until 1957. Another exercise followed, designated “Spring Shower” and the two set the precedent for combined exercises that still exists today. Subsequent joint exercises, “Counterblow” and “Strong Shield,”[4] focused on interoperability and command relations between the two militaries, maintaining a basic readiness posture and conducting counter-insurgency operations.
With the establishment of the US Unified Command Plan in 1957, the US Far East Command was replaced by the US Pacific Command and UNC headquarters moved from Tokyo to Seoul. After 1957 and up to the establishment of the Combined Forces Command in 1978, the UNC planned and led all combined exercises within the Alliance.
The “Second Korean War” Phase
North Korean provocations reached such a crescendo during the late 1960s that this period earned the reputation as a “second Korean War.” From 1966 to 1975, Pyongyang launched a steady series of provocations aimed at taking advantage of the US military commitment in Vietnam and the deployment of a corps-size ROK unit there to support that effort.[5] North Korea’s military technology was very limited during this period, relying on whatever equipment and technology the former Soviet Union and China were willing to provide and thus unable to develop distinct military advantages difficult for the alliance to counter. However, North Korea began to slowly relocate much of its active-duty military forces forward toward the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), thus reducing warning time and complicating battlefield defense strategies for the alliance.
Casualties were heavy on both sides as a result of these clashes. Over one thousand ROK soldiers and policemen and 171 civilians died as a result of North Korea’s armed infiltration operations while 111 American soldiers were wounded and 75 killed in action. This included 36 airmen who died as a result of the North Korean shoot-down of a US Air Force EC-121M reconnaissance aircraft in 1969. Almost 300 North Korean infiltrators were killed in action inside South Korean territory.[6] Other major provocations during this period included the 1968 North Korean attempt to assassinate ROK President Park Chung-hee, known as the Blue House raid; another assassination attempt in 1974 that resulted in the death of the South Korean first lady; and the 1968 hijacking of the US Navy intelligence ship, the Pueblo.
Beginning in 1968, the UNC revised its exercise program, replacing Counterblow and Strong Shield with “Focus Lens,” and also took advantage of the development of new approaches to war game simulations. One major response to lethal North Korean provocations took place during the first Focus Lens exercise of 1968 (infrequently referred to as Focus Retina). Three airborne infantry battalions from the 82nd Airborne Division flew 31 hours non-stop from North Carolina to drop south of the Han River in a show of how quickly the US could respond to North Korean hostilities.[7]
The Expanded Capabilities Phase
The period from 1976 to 1991 was characterized by an increase in the size of combined ROK-US exercises; the November 1978 establishment of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC), which assumed leadership and planning of all combined exercises (and continues to this date); the modernization of the ROK economy; and the dramatic expansion of the North Korean military to over one million men on active duty, as well as its continued deployment of forces in a forward posture.
In 1976, the South Korean readiness exercises, designated Ulchi, and Focus Lens were integrated to create an expanded exercise that combined South Korean government and combined command post exercises for a broader approach to defense of the ROK. Held annually in late summer, Ulchi Focus Lens, or UFL, ultimately became the largest computer-assisted simulation exercise in the world.[8]
Additionally, beginning in 1976, the alliance introduced a new exercise, dubbed “Team Spirit,” that emphasized force flow and force-on-force operations. The ability of the United States to flow forces to the Korean peninsula in case of conflict was a critical component of operational plans and also demonstrated a continued strong commitment to the defense of South Korea. Those forces would then exercise with major units opposing each other in simulated battle. Conducted in the early spring, Team Spirit served to unite several smaller exercises into one large one emphasizing field-maneuver. It grew over the years from an initial participation of 107,000 US and South Korean troops to over 200,000 in the late 1980s.[9]
Because of its size, Team Spirit became a major concern for the North Koreans. It became a key issue in Washington-Pyongyang negotiations during the nuclear crisis of 1993-94. Visiting North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in 1993, New York Congressman Gary Ackerman stated that Kim’s voice “quivered and his hands shook with anger” at the mention of Team Spirit.[10]
The combination of Ulchi Focus Lens and Team Spirit during this phase was a major step in the ROK-US alliance efforts to improve South Korea’s defense posture. However, toward the end of this phase, North Korean capabilities began to go “asymmetric,” namely by fielding of non-conventional weapons systems that were extremely difficult to counter with conventional forces. Most importantly, Pyongyang began programs to develop weapons of mass destruction and the systems to deliver them.
The Asymmetric Capabilities Phase
Beginning in 1992 and lasting until today, this phase is characterized by North Korea’s development of nuclear and missile programs; the deployment of long-range artillery north of the DMZ capable of striking all of Seoul and most of its suburbs; the fielding of 200,000 special operations troops; the high degree of nuclear tensions; the advancement of the North’s cyber warfare capability; and the transition of operational control of South Korean forces back to Seoul’s wartime control.
Moreover, North Korea’s political stability during this period was significantly challenged by a failing economy and the great famine of the 1990s that took the lives of somewhere between 500,000 to 3,000,000 North Koreans, depending on which source is cited. This had a distinct impact on the stability of the North Korean regime and suggested scenarios in which the North Korean military could react in unpredictable ways that directly threatened South Korea. Would economic collapse cause the collapse of the North Korean regime? If so, could this lead to civil war that might spill over into the South? Would a failing regime order an attack on the South to avoid losing power?
These changing conditions required changed responses intended to cope with important challenges such as dealing with a dramatically evolving threat, who is in the lead—ROK or US—and at what point in crisis, and how does interoperability change with different leadership?
From 1991 to 1996, Team Spirit became both a carrot and a stick during US negotiations with North Korea over its burgeoning nuclear program. This exercise was cancelled in 1992, carried out again in 1993, and planned but not executed from 1994 to 1996 as a result of negotiations that led to the 1994 US-DPRK Agreed Framework and efforts to ensure the framework remained in effect. Team Spirit was then replaced with a command post exercise known as “Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration” (RSO&I)—which was conducted from 1994 until 2007 along with “Foal Eagle,” a series of tactical level exercises taking place in the spring. These exercises were much smaller than Team Spirit but maintained staff readiness in the conduct of flowing US forces to the peninsula.
In 2007, RSO&I was replaced by “Key Resolve” (a command post exercise that trains staff instead of field units). Key Resolve and Foal Eagle (the exercise for field units) run near simultaneously and continue to be carried out. Ulchi Focus Lens continued until 2007 when it was succeeded by “Ulchi Freedom Guardian” (both command post exercises) to reflect changes of leadership within the alliance.
The Future
The legacy of the ROK-US combined exercises is not only vastly improved readiness in the defense of South Korea and the continued deterrence of large-scale conventional attacks by Pyongyang, but also North Korea’s healthy respect for the combined force posture of the alliance. For the future, there are a number of issues that may change how the allies conduct combined exercises. For example, the operational control of the South’s forces is scheduled to transition to the ROK in 2015, putting South Korea in charge of decision-making, and planning. Second, when and if North Korea is deemed capable of mounting nuclear warheads on delivery systems able to reach the United States, exercises will have to be adjusted to reflect the new requirements for defending American allies as well as the United States. These challenges to the alliance will require military and civilian dedication, supreme effort, artful leadership and not just a few dollars to accomplish.

Friday, February 14, 2014

LATEST INTEL: North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site Excavation Activity!

North Korea’s Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site Excavation Activity!

 Significant Acceleration in Excavation Activity

 No Test Indicators

Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates a significant acceleration in excavation activity at the West Portal area since last viewed in early December 2013. The size of the pile of spoil excavated from a new tunnel appears to have doubled in a period of a little over a month. Exactly what accounts for this acceleration remains unclear. However, it is unlikely Pyongyang intends to use this tunnel for its next nuclear test since two other tunnels in the Southern area of the site appear complete. Because the Southern area is often covered in shadows during the winter, coverage by commercial satellites can prove to be spotty. As a result, it was not possible to view the tunnel entrances in the most recent February imagery.
Once a decision is made in Pyongyang, indicators visible in satellite imagery of an impending nuclear test can appear 4-6 weeks prior to the test, both near the tunnel entrance and in other areas of the site. In the past, they have included:
  • Camouflage netting deployed to conceal activities at the tunnel entrance itself during preparations for a blast;
  • A satellite communications dish for relaying data off-site in the vicinity of the test tunnel;
  • A special vehicle covered by an awning and surrounded by many personnel in the central support/staging area; and
  • A marked increase in overall activity at the central support area and roads leading to the test tunnel.
Based on the most recent satellite imagery, there are no signs that a test is in preparation.
Accelerated Tunnel Excavation at the West Portal Area
Recent commercial satellite imagery indicates a significant increase in excavation activity at a new still incomplete tunnel to be used for a future nuclear test in the West Portal area. As previously discussed, excavation of this new tunnel was first detected in May 2013 and continued throughout the year. Imagery from February 3, 2014 shows that the spoil pile—consisting of debris from excavation—apparently doubled in size from what was done during all of 2013. (Mining carts can be seen on the tracks to the spoil pile.) In fact, spoil recently dumped onto the pile spilled on the access road to the portal requiring that it be cleared.

Figure 1. Spoil pile growth in 2014.

As of December 2013, the volume of spoil was estimated to be some 2000 cubic meters. Assuming a two meter wide by two meter tall tunnel that would allow sufficient access but still minimize the amount of digging required, that volume of spoil would have corresponded to 500 meters of tunnel. Since December 2013, and especially in January, digging was accelerated and the spoil pile area appears to have doubled again, implying yet another 500 meters of tunnel dug. It must be recognized, however, that satellite imagery estimates are often imprecise because the depth of the spoil pile can only be roughly estimated.
If these estimates are correct, they represent a significant acceleration of North Korean efforts since the beginning of 2014 to complete excavation of this new tunnel. There may be a number of possible explanations including: 1) the tunnel may have become easier to excavate because the rock is softer or looser; 2) the North Koreans may be trying to make up lost time to meet the tunnel’s scheduled date for completion; or 3) Pyongyang has decided to accelerate work in order to complete the tunnel ahead of schedule.
Is a Test in the Works?
In addition to the tunnel under excavation at the West Portal area, North Korea appears to have two completed tunnels at the South Portal area that could be used for a nuclear test if Pyongyang decided to conduct one. When last viewed in early December 2013 there were no signs of test preparations, although it is likely a test could be prepared in 1-2 months once the order is given by Pyongyang.
According to press reports, South Korean Minister of Defense Kim Kwan-jin recently stated that the North appears ready to conduct another test although there are no signs that a blast is imminent. That assessment appears correct, although in the most recent February image, the entrances to the two completed tunnels in the South Portal area are in a deep shadow, as they will be for much of the winter, making it difficult to determine if any activity is taking place there.
Based on observation of the previous North Korean nuclear tests in 2009 and 2013, once a decision is made in Pyongyang, indicators visible in satellite imagery of an impending nuclear test can appear 4-6 weeks prior to a detonation. Possible indicators—some at the entrances and some away from them—observed in past tests have included:
  • The North Koreans appear to have deployed camouflage netting to conceal activities at the tunnel entrance itself during preparations for a blast.
  • A satellite communications dish for relaying data off-site was present in the weeks prior to the February 2013 detonation and then removed ten days before the blast. A similar dish was present before the 2009 test in the vicinity of the test tunnel.
  • A special vehicle covered by an awning and surrounded by many personnel whose purpose was unclear was present in the central support/staging area on February 9, 2013, just four days before the detonation.
  • There was a marked increase in overall activity at the central support area and roads leading to the test tunnel in the weeks before the February 2013 blast. Such activity would be expected if North Korea were preparing for a detonation.
As of the most recent satellite imagery there are no signs that a test is in preparations.